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EXPLAINING CHINA’S LEGAL
FLEXIBILITY: HISTORY AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
Justin W. Evans*
ABSTRACT
China’s legal system appears to harbor a major tension, or
even a paradox. Certainty in law facilitates economic progress,
which most observers agree the Communist Party requires to
maintain its power—yet the Party has opted for a flexible legal
system that often impedes predictability. Prior studies explain
China’s legal system as a product of certain constraints and as an
expedient that allows for policy adjustments. These factors
undoubtedly are at work but do not fully explain the rationale for a
legal design seemingly at odds with the Party’s economic goals. To
obtain a fuller view, it is necessary to consult the historical
circumstances in which the designers of China’s legal system were
embedded. This Paper argues that the Party’s reformers achieved
a percipient historical insight: the Party would require an ongoing
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship to survive
after Mao. Moreover, the reformers understood this competency to
embody not only the substance of policy, but also, crucially, the
Party’s institutional stewardship. Of its many advantages, flexible
law reinforces the Party’s dominance in institutional
entrepreneurship, enabling the Party to impede rival entrepreneurs
without disrupting the broader economic frameworks in place.
*Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Parker College of Business,
Georgia Southern University (juwevans@alumni.iu.edu). I presented this paper at
the ALSB annual meeting in Savannah, Georgia (August 2017) and at the
Seventeenth Huber Hurst Research Seminar at the University of Florida (February
2018), and thank the Hurst Seminar participants for their detailed feedback:
Robert Bird, Leora Eisenstadt, Robert Emerson, Stephanie Greene, Stephen Park,
Robert Prentice, Michael Schuster, Abbey Stemler, Robert Thomas, Jeff Todd,
and Deepa Varadarajan. Larry DiMatteo’s feedback was particularly extensive
and insightful, and I am grateful to have had his guidance. I am indebted to Chris
Brkich for his comments on a later draft. I thank Jennifer, Anna, and Emma for
their love and support. Any errors are mine.
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Institutions with strategic functions emerge and viewed thusly, the
economic tradeoffs inherent in China’s flexible laws are not the
paradox that they seem. The Paper briefly considers the
implications of this historical context for multinationals’ strategies
in China and for states’ strategic uses of flexibility in international
legal institutions.
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Even before seeking the common good, the first objective of power is to
continue to exist . . .
— Li Ma1
[I]t is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the
strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able
best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds
itself.
— Leon C. Megginson2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal predictability facilitates economic growth by enabling
businesspeople to act confidently and efficiently.3 Western models
present legal predictability as a critical support for civil society.
Conversely, Western perspectives typically hold only negative
views toward flexible legal institutions—those whose meanings and
applications are substantially open to question, such that regulated
parties cannot easily predict the legal treatment of their actions.4
1

Li Ma, A Comparison of the Legitimacy of Power Between Confucianist
and Legalist Philosophies, 10 ASIAN PHIL. 49, 50 (2000).
2
Leon C. Megginson, Lessons from Europe for American Business, 44
S.W. SOC. SCI. Q. 3, 4 (1963) (summarizing Darwin’s Origin of Species).
3
See Justin W. Evans & Anthony L. Gabel, Legal Competitive
Advantage and Legal Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary International Framework,
39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 333, 349–56 (2014) (noting also, inter alia, that
observers have long searched for the optimal balance between legal certainty and
predictability on one hand, and legal flexibility and adaptability on the other).
4
Legal flexibilities, then, are the features of a legal system that impose
uncertainty on regulated parties as to the permissibility of their contemplated
actions. See id. at 367–88 (noting that legal flexibility exists in degrees and
discussing flexibility as the features of law that complicate one’s ability to predict
consistently and accurately the legal ramifications of one’s actions); id. at 382–88
(observing that while some degree of flexibility exists in every legal system in the
world, those that promote relatively high degrees of predictability can be labeled
“high rule of law” jurisdictions, whereas those that entail relatively substantial
degrees of flexibility and uncertainty are “low rule of law” jurisdictions). Other
works characterize the broader but related concept of “institutional flexibility” as
a mechanism by which states can change rules, and this sense of the term is
inherent in the one adopted here. See, e.g., Lewis S. Davis, Institutional Flexibility
and Economic Growth, 38 J. COMP. ECON. 306, 307 (2010) (defining institutional
flexibility as “the propensity to develop new economic institutions in response to

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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Flexible legal regimes impose relatively high degrees of uncertainty
on regulated parties, and hence tend to raise the transaction costs and
risks of doing business.5 On average then, the more flexible a
country’s law, the less efficiently its markets operate.6
For these reasons, the legal system of the People’s Republic
of China (“PRC”) presents a major tension, or even a paradox.7 To
begin, most Western observers do not ordinarily associate formal
law (in its Western sense, anyway) with authoritarian societies, for
the obvious reason that legal rules must prevail over the whims of
political authorities in order for law to be reasonably predictable—
and such an arrangement is inherently at odds with authoritarianism.
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or the “Party”)
chose to construct a formal legal system beginning in the late 1970s.
Most observers have accepted that in order for China to achieve
major economic progress, it would have to attract foreign
investment and protect incentives for economic activity, and hence,
formal law assumed a heightened stature in post-Mao China. Still,
the tension between authoritarian rule and formal legality pervades
the PRC business environment.8
changing economic conditions”); Christopher Marcoux, Institutional Flexibility
in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 26 CONFLICT MGMT. &
PEACE SCI. 209, 211 (2009) (defining institutional flexibility as “various formal
and informal mechanisms by which states can change the terms of their
cooperation” with one another); see also Part III.A (discussing the types of legal
flexibilities).
5
See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 349–56.
6
Id.; accord LINDA YUEH, ENTERPRISING CHINA: BUSINESS, ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 61 (2011); see also Yi Feng, Political Freedom,
Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and
Private Investment in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 271 (2001)
(finding, inter alia, that policy uncertainties adversely affect private investment
in a country).
7
See, e.g., Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the
PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 375 (2002) (noting the “contradiction” between the
economic benefits of certainty and the political benefits of flexibility in the law).
8
Gil Lan, American Legal Realism Goes to China: The China Puzzle
and Law Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 368 (2014) (arguing that China’s informal
institutional arrangements have sometimes yielded sufficient certainty for
economic actors, such that “[t]he picture that emerges from China is not a
simplistic dichotomy of having formal law or not”).
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Stranger than the existence of the PRC’s formal law is its
considerable flexibility. As noted above, China must experience
satisfactory economic growth in order for the CCP to maintain social
stability and, in turn, its political monopoly.9 Given the importance
of economic growth to the CCP’s own welfare and the support that
predictable legal rules lend to economic performance, one might
suspect that the CCP would find appealing the sort of stable and
predictable legal regimes associated with Western economies. Yet
the PRC possesses one of the most flexible legal systems among the
world’s major economies. China is not the only country noted for
its legal flexibility—but some countries marked by flexible law can
do no differently.10 In contrast, the CCP has embraced legal
flexibility,11 despite the stultifying economic consequences that
accompany institutional uncertainty.12
What can account for this choice? Why is the PRC’s legal
system so flexible when economic success is so important to its
creators? Scholarly explanations have varied over time. Some
drivers of flexible law are not a choice, but a product of the CCP’s
constraints.
For instance, human language is inherently
indeterminate, such that it is impossible to remove all ambiguity
from law.13 And sometimes the language of a law is made flexible
or ambiguous to attract the requisite support needed for passage in
the legislative process.14 Others factors, however, reflect a choice:
9

See infra Part III.C (discussing how the CCP’s legitimacy is now more
reliant upon economic factors than on ideology).
10
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 385–86.
11
See infra Part III.A. This is not to say that PRC law is infinitely
flexible; some measure of certainty and clarity exist. There are occasions when
the CCP rationally limits its own flexibility. E.g., Lan, supra note 8, at 401–02
(discussing banking regulations designed to promote certainty against state
expropriation as an example). Padgett and Answell argue that “[a]mbiguity and
heterogeneity, not planning and self-interest, are the raw materials of which
powerful states and persons are constructed.” John Padgett & Christopher
Answell, Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434, 98 AM. J. SOC.
1259, 1259 (1993). This Paper agrees that ambiguity is useful in building a strong
state, but urges that planning and self-interest can also be coordinated with the
state’s use of ambiguity.
12
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 389–90.
13
See, e.g., Lan, supra note 8, at 418–19.
14
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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flexible law conserves the “maneuverability” the CCP must have in
order to respond to rapidly developing social and economic
circumstances.15 This explanation is often framed in terms of
China’s status as a developing economy.16
This Paper integrates these views into its own account of
PRC legal flexibility. But these prior explanations do not tell the
whole story. A focused examination of history has not been brought
to bear on this topic, nor has institutional theory. History and
institutionalism reveal another fundamental explanation for why the
PRC’s law is so flexible. Flexibility was a strategic imperative for
the CCP’s reformers because they had achieved a critical historical
insight that their predecessors lacked. While China’s prior rulers
had failed due to many complex factors, chief among these was their
ineffectiveness as institutional entrepreneurs.17 The reformers were
determined not to commit the same error. The CCP would need to
remain entrepreneurial with respect to the substance of policy
(which it had long been doing), but a further step was needed. The
CCP’s legal institutions would have to permit the existence of
potential competitors for power—that is, other institutional
entrepreneurs—while disallowing these actors from eclipsing the
Party’s influence. And this would have to be accomplished without
major disruptions to China’s nascent market institutions or to the
CCP’s own legitimacy.
This logic, however, spawned its own dilemma. A formal
legal system would be required to attract the foreign investment
necessary to finance a state strong enough to reclaim China’s
security in a menacing global environment. Yet China’s own
history suggested that an entrenched formal law would either
constrain the CCP’s ability to rule (if the Party itself were to actually
15

Corne, supra note 7, at 375.
Hence, this explanation often implies that the PRC’s legal flexibilities
will invariably dissipate as the country’s economy progresses, until such time that
the PRC legal system, like those of the West, is highly predictable. This Paper
will argue, however, that there are limits to just how certain and predictable—
how entrenched—the CCP can allow law to become. See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part III; see also JOSEPH FEWSMITH, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS
OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA 9–10 (2013) (noting that “institutional creation
is often glossed over” in the literature). Recent scholarship examines institutional
creation in authoritarian contexts. Id.
16
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observe the law), or would force the CCP regularly to disregard the
law in maintaining control over society (in which case the Party
would have enacted an institution destined to eviscerate its own
legitimacy). Of course, neither such scenario would maximize the
Party’s utility. And in either event, the mere existence of formal
legal institutions would enable rival institutional entrepreneurs who
might seek to bend the law to their interests at the expense of the
CCP’s control. This very real threat was heightened considerably
as economic reforms legitimized private wealth—and with it, the
new sources of influence that non-Party actors would wield as a
function of their wealth.18
The resolution to this dilemma was a system of formal law—
but one that is highly flexible. Indeed, legal flexibility is the
linchpin of the CCP’s post-Mao survival strategy. Of the many
benefits of flexibility for the CCP, the most significant is that, in
contrast to China’s past rulers, each generation of authorities must
now actively manage the PRC’s institutions continuously and
strategically, in form as well as in substance—to shape China’s
institutions on the Party’s terms, despite the vast array of potential
institutional rivals that inevitably arise in the presence of formal law.
The CCP’s corresponding economic goal is thus seen not as
economic growth per se, but rather, as growth commensurate with
the Party’s ongoing rule.19
What emerges, then, are institutions with important strategic
functions. More generally, flexible legal institutions can represent
critical strategic assets for authoritarian political incumbents
attempting to survive modern global pressures.20 Yet this holds as
well for multinational companies (“MNCs”) operating in lower rule
of law jurisdictions.21 While flexible law is perceived as an
institution from society’s perspective, it can function as a resource
for the state and, in different ways, for the adroit MNC. How such
18

See infra Part III.
See infra Parts III, V.
20
See infra Parts II–III; see also DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A.
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 40–41
(2009) (explaining that globalization can encourage democratization, and thereby
pressure authoritarians).
21
See infra Part V.
19
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legal institutions come to exist is the principal focus of this Paper.
Legal flexibilities are sometimes deployed strategically as a means
to foster the political survival of their creators. This is what has
occurred in the PRC. Using a historical event sequencing
methodology, this Paper interprets the PRC’s legal flexibility as one
of the CCP’s most crucial institutional efforts at self-preservation.22
The PRC makes an excellent case study for this international
phenomenon of the strategic uses of legal flexibility. This is because
the CCP’s survival turns upon its adeptness in directing and
responding to the evolution of Chinese society by using, among
other mechanisms, the country’s legal system. For all of the
critiques that China’s legal institutions inspire from the West—often
for goals or measured by standards that they were never intended to
embody23—the PRC’s legal order can supply some measure of
security and predictability while also providing a fertile ground for
the entrepreneurial lawyers who guide MNCs’ legal strategies.24
This Paper offers a Western interpretation25 of China’s legal
environment as ordered by a blending of logics,26 some unique to
22

See infra Part III. Party control of the military is its other most crucial
institutional support. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION 238–62 (7th ed. 2002).
23
Scholars note the futility of imposing Western assumptions on China.
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government and State: On
Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law
System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 339 (2012); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CHINESE CIVIL
JUSTICE, PAST AND PRESENT xi–xviii (2010); PHILIP RICHARDSON, ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN CHINA, C. 1800-1950, at 2–3 (1999).
24
See infra Part V.
25
Taisu Zhang, Beyond Methodological Eurocentrism: Comparing the
Chinese and European Legal Traditions, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 195, 206 (2016)
(urging that comparisons of legal systems, and studies of one legal system by
scholars who inhabit dissimilar jurisdictions, “should be performed with care, and
preferably with some sense of methodological self-awareness.”).
26
See infra Part III; Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional
Logics and the Historical Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive
Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958–1990, 105 AM. J.
SOC. 801, 804 (1999) (stating that institutional logics are “the socially
constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs,
and rules by which individuals . . . provide meaning to their social reality”);
accord W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS
INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES 90 (4th ed. 2013).

9

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

182

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:08 PM

[Vol. 31:1

China and others more transcendent in nature. The PRC’s legal
apparatus, like any nation’s,27 is a product of both these universal
notions and the conditions unique to its elites.28 This Paper
contributes to our understanding of the PRC in its own right, but
there is an added benefit to the institutional approach: MNCs can
apply the lessons of history to their operations in the PRC. By
understanding how the PRC’s legal context came to exist,29 Western
enterprises will be better positioned to integrate Chinese law into
their strategic decision-making processes.30 In addition, this study
suggests certain similarities relating to flexibilities in international
legal institutions.31 The Paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach
to these topics, drawing from law, history, and business.32 In doing
so, the Paper contributes to law and strategy (“LAS”), a growing
research stream within the broader business law scholarship that
seeks to understand how legal competencies and resources should

27

For instance, homogenous transnational elements and unique domestic
factors both shape emergent constitutional orders. Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic
Constitution: Lessons from the World’s Newest Nation, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667
(2012).
28
Lan, supra note 8, at 386 (noting that the law’s designers “will
undoubtedly be informed by their own local, cultural understandings”); see also
id. at 390 (noting that a “context-sensitive approach is important in
understanding” PRC law).
29
See infra Parts II–III; see Klaus E. Meyer & Mike W. Peng,
Theoretical Foundations of Emerging Economy Business Research, 47 J. INT’L
BUS. STUD. 3, 8 (2016) (noting that context remains important in international
business because the legal convergence that some scholars have predicted appears
illusive); accord Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 347; Joan Enric Ricart et al.,
New Frontiers in International Strategy, 35 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 175, 178 (2004)
(contending that the fundamental question in international strategy is “why do
countries differ?”); Patrick Regnér & Jesper Edman, MNE Institutional
Advantage: How Subunits Shape, Transpose and Evade Host Country
Institutions, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 275, 276–77 (2014) (noting that “context has
a direct influence on the strategies of MNEs”).
30
See infra Part V; Geoffrey Jones & Tarun Khanna, Bringing History
(Back) Into International Business, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 453 (2006).
31
See infra Part IV.
32
Robert C. Bird, Special Report: Legal Scholarship in Business
Schools, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 9, 11–12 (2016) (noting that law is inherently
interdisciplinary).
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inform business strategy.33 The Paper expands the LAS analysis to
show one means by which governments can approach law
strategically, and proposes future research on the implications of
China’s historical context for the MNC’s strategic approach to
China’s legal uncertainties. The Paper does not normatively endorse
the PRC’s political structure. Rather, it suggests that when Western
attorneys and businesspeople ascribe only negative potential to the
PRC’s legal flexibilities, their belief is self-defeating.34 Astute
actors can harness such flexibilities to their own benefit.35
Scholars’ assumptions have inspired numerous debates over
the role of law in Chinese society.36 The key assumption in this
analysis is that the CCP’s most basic priority is its own survival as
a political monopoly.37 The CCP is thus assumed to act for its own
interests and its monopoly is taken as non-negotiable.38 The benefits
accruing to monopolists are considerable,39 and thus Party members
are generally incentivized (albeit imperfectly) to act in furtherance

33

Robert C. Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J.
575, 575 (2010); see also infra Part V.
34
See Lan, supra note 8, at 369 (illustrating that observers might
misunderstand an unfamiliar legal system on account of subtle contextual factors);
see infra Part V (noting that, similarly, Western firms should not discount the
potential strategic value of China’s flexible legal system simply because it
deviates from Western norms).
35
See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3.
36
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION
AND TRADITION 10 (9th ed. 2014).
37
Many others invoke this assumption as well. See, e.g., Stanley
Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 77 (2006).
38
This precept has been codified: China is “under the leadership of the
Communist Party.” XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.). For economists, “the real
question is whether [legal markets] are efficient.” PATRICK A. MCNUTT,
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW 17 (2010). This Paper is less concerned with the
efficiency of China’s legal institutions (clearly, more efficient alternatives could
be implemented) and instead focuses on their effectiveness, as measured by the
goals of those who designed them. See infra Part III.
39
See, e.g., ANDREW G. WALDER, CHINA UNDER MAO: A REVOLUTION
DERAILED 118 (2015); Bruce J. Dickson, Dilemmas of Party Adaptation: The
CCP’s Strategies for Survival, in CHINESE POLITICS 22 (Peter Hays Gries &
Stanley Rosen eds., 2010).
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of their monopoly. Such acts include the institutional maintenance
of the Party-state.40
Part II discusses the theoretical lens of institutional theory and
the analytical method of historical event sequencing that will be
used to assess why PRC law is so flexible. Part III then applies these
tools to argue that a system of flexible formal legality is strategically
optimal for the CCP in its role as institutional entrepreneur. Since
flexibilities exist to some degree in all legal institutions,41 Part IV
considers the circumstances under which the implications gleaned
from China can be applied to international legal institutions. Part V
concludes the Paper and argues that MNCs can better strategically
account for the vicissitudes of the PRC’s legal flexibilities by
viewing in context the historical reasons that these flexibilities exist
in the first place.
II. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMISM AND HISTORICAL EVENT
SEQUENCING
This Part discusses the theoretical lens of institutional theory
and analytical method of event sequencing to be utilized in
answering the question of why the PRC legal system is so flexible.
These frameworks inform the analysis in Part III, infra.
A. Core Ideas of Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurship
Institutional theory concerns the impact of context on human
phenomena42 and explains how one’s embeddedness within an
environment matters—that is, “how institutions constrain and
structure action” and thereby “create regularities and stability.”43
40

PRC law is deemed to be instrumentalist. See, e.g., Yuanyuan Shen,
Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law
Reform in Modern China, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20, 37–
38 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds., 2015). The
question then becomes what value flexibility contributes to this instrumentalism.
41
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 372–87.
42
Marie Laure Djelic, Institutional Perspectives—Working Towards
Coherence or Irreconcilable Diversity?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP.
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 15, 16 (2010).
43
Id. An institution’s adaptability can also promote its stability. TERESA
WRIGHT, PARTY AND STATE IN POST-MAO CHINA 2 (2015) [hereinafter PARTY
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The theory examines how “organizations better secure their
positions and legitimacy by conforming to the rules and norms of
the . . . environment.”44
Institutionalism thus emphasizes
“regulatory, social, and cultural influences that promote [the]
survival and legitimacy of an organization rather than focusing
solely on efficiency-seeking behavior.”45
Institution “broadly refers to the formal rule sets . . . less
formal shared interaction[s] . . . and taken-for-granted assumptions
. . . that organizations and individuals are expected to follow.”46
Institutions are thus “‘the humanly devised constraints that structure
human interaction’ . . . and include formal rules and laws as well as
informal influences like cultural norms.”47 The law, then, is a formal
institution,48 and countries are ‘configurations’ of interacting sets

AND STATE]. Stability “results when . . . dominant groups reproduce their power.”
Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields, 19 SOC. THEORY 105, 109

(2001).

44

Garry D. Bruton et al., Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurship:
Where Are We Now and Where Do We Need to Move In the Future?, 34 ENTRE.
THEORY & PRAC. 421, 422 (2010). Scholars agree “that legitimacy is necessary
for organizational continuity and success.” Tammy L. MacLean & Michael
Benham, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between Compliance
Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 53 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 1499, 1500 (2010). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Id.
(quoting Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995)).
45
Bruton et al., supra note 44, at 422.
46
Id.; accord Djelic, supra note 42, at 26 (noting a popular definition of
institutions as the “rules of the game providing stability and meaning”) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); Institution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
801 (7th ed. 1999) (defining in the legal context as “an elementary rule, principle,
or practice”).
47
Sheila M. Puffer et al., Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: The
Impact of Formal Institutional Voids, 34 ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 441, 444
(2010) (internal citation omitted).
48
See, e.g., Friederike Welter & David Smallbone, Institutional
Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Behavior in Challenging Environments, 49 J.
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 107, 109 (2011); Desirée F. Pacheco et al., The Coevolution
of Institutional Entrepreneurship: A Tale of Two Theories, 36 J. MGMT. 974, 981–
85 (2010).

13

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

186

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:08 PM

[Vol. 31:1

and subsets of institutions in which the legal system is a key formal
institution.49
Several variants of institutional theory exist.50 Some view
institutions as so powerful that individuals are assumed to lack free
will,51 while others posit that institutions are instead one of many
factors influencing individuals’ behaviors.52 This Paper adopts the
latter variant since “institutional theory can accommodate interestseeking, active organizational behavior when organizations’
responses to [institutions] are not assumed to be invariably passive
and conforming across all institutional conditions.”53 Accordingly,
formal institutions—including legal systems—can be designed
consciously and deliberately.54 As such, rules are the most basic
49

Bruce Kogut, Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Social Science
Data, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 139, 140
(2010). Inter-institutional systems are also important to explaining changes in
institutional logics. Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional Logics,
in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 99, 117
(Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008); see also infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the
logics of the Maoists and reformers).
50
See generally Djelic, supra note 42; Paul DiMaggio, The New
Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 696 (1998); W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of
Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 493 (1987).
51
See, e.g., John W. Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theories of
Organizations, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALISM 790, 794–95 (2008) (discussing the phenomenological version
of sociological institutionalism).
52
Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 145, 146 (1991) [hereinafter Strategic Responses]; accord
Raghu Garud et al., Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 28 ORG. STUD. 957, 961 (2007).
53
Strategic Responses, supra note 52, at 146; Regnér & Edman, supra
note 29, at 278. MNCs possess institutional agency. Xavier Martin, Institutional
Advantage, 4 GLOBAL STRAT. J. 55, 61–66 (2014) (observing that MNCs possess
institutional agency). “[I]nstitutional influences and firm discretion are truly
complementary concepts.” Martin, supra, at 66.
54
Robert E. Bedeski, The Evolution of the Modern State in China:
Nationalist and Communist Continuities, 27 WORLD POL. 541, 543 (1975);
Michael Byers, International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L
RELATIONS 612 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2010). Both “rule
makers” and “rule takers” try to influence institutions. See Wolfgang Streeck &
Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political
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component of institutions and “regulate organizational action.”55
Rules are “shaped by constructive interpretations embedded in a
history of language, experience, memory, and trust.”56 Still, this
“openness in interpretation means that while institutions structure
. . . governance and create a certain ‘bias,’ they ordinarily do not
determine a political behavior or outcomes in detail.”57 The power
of institutions can be attenuated by, inter alia, individuals’
ignorance of which rules exist, or what a rule prescribes for specific
actors in specific situations; moreover, “[t]here may be competing
rules and competing interpretations of rules and situations.”58
Historical institutionalists “view institutions first and foremost as
the political legacies of concrete historical struggles.”59
Accordingly, institutions are seen as “distributional instruments
laden with power implications”60 in which ambiguity is a permanent
feature.61 Institutions thus partly represent actors’ strategic

Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY 1, 13–14 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen
Thelen eds., 2005) (detailing institutions as regimes with rules intermediating
between rule makers and rule takers); see also Streeck & Thelen, supra, at 27
(observing that “actors are strategic and even those not involved in the design of
an institution will do everything in their power to interpret its rules in their own
interest or circumvent or subvert rules that clash with their interests”).
55
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Elaborating the “New
Institutionalism”, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 3, 8
(R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006). Rules “refer to prescriptions commonly known
and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships,”
while prescriptions “refer to which actions (or states of the world) are required,
prohibited, or permitted.” Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the Study of Institutions,
in POLYCENTRIC GAMES AND INSTITUTIONS 89, 91–93 (M.D. McGinnis ed.,
2000).
56
March & Olsen, supra note 55, at 8.
57
Id.
58
Id.; accord Scott, supra note 50, at 500–01; see also Evans & Gabel,
supra note 3, at 371–82 (noting other sources of institutional attenuation).
59
James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional
Change, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7–8 (James Mahoney &
Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010); accord Elizabeth Sanders, Historical
Institutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 39, 39
(R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2008).
60
Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 59, at 7–8.
61
Id. at 11.
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choices.62 When “institutions are capable of being understood in
more than one way, gaps between institutionalized expectations . . .
and strategic action must be filled,” and “[t]hese gaps allow scope
for creative interpretation, application, and enactment[.]”63
To summarize—institutions are the formal and informal
rules that an organization must observe to be deemed “legitimate,”
and while they thereby influence organizational behaviors, rarely
are institutions so powerful as to deprive actors of their agency.64
This allows for the importance of entrepreneurship as both an
expression of free will despite one’s institutional embeddedness and
as a method or strategy for coping with institutions. The
entrepreneurship construct means more than the creation of new
business ventures.65 Entrepreneurship, broadly construed, “is the
process of creating value by bringing together a unique combination
of resources to exploit an opportunity.”66 Entrepreneurs, then, “are
people with vision who create new things.”67 Entrepreneurship is
exercised in various contexts “to bring about new economic, social,
institutional, or cultural environments,”68 such that entrepreneurs
“create value where there was none before,” “within organizations
and . . . in the marketplace.”69

62

Gregory Jackson, Actors and Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
64–65 (2010).
63
Id. at 78.
64
Agency is “an actor’s ability to have some effect on the social world”
such as “altering the rules[.]” SCOTT, supra note 26, at 94 (noting also that “[t]he
presence of agency presumes a nondeterminant, ‘voluntaristic’ theory of action”);
accord Julie Battilana, Agency and Institutions: The Enabling Role of Individuals’
Social Position, 13 ORG. 653, 657 (2006).
65
DONALD F. KURATKO, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY, PROCESS, AND
PRACTICE 3 (10th ed. 2014); see also Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The
Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217,
218 (2000) (discussing the focal points of the entrepreneurship domain).
66
MICHAEL H. MORRIS ET AL., CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
INNOVATION 9 (3rd ed. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
67
Fligstein, supra note 43, at 107.
68
Elco van Burg & A. Georges L. Romme, Creating the Future
Together: Toward a Framework for Research Synthesis in Entrepreneurship, 38
ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 369, 369 (2014).
69
MORRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 9.

OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 63,
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Institutional entrepreneurs70 are individuals or organizations
who create, transform, or destroy institutions.71 Hence, institutional
entrepreneurship “refers to the ‘activities of actors . . . who leverage
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones.’”72
Institutional entrepreneurship can thus be viewed not only as an
extension of institutional theory (with its emphasis on constraints),
but also as an extension of entrepreneurship (with its emphasis on
agency despite one’s constraints).73 Its products include new
regulatory schema, organizational forms, practices, and identities.74
One key motive for trying to change institutions is to legitimize the
entrepreneur’s existence and activities75—a topic addressed in Part
III with respect to the CCP’s attempt to legitimate its ongoing
political monopoly after Mao, in part through a new legal system.
Institutions and entrepreneurship are thus linked.76 Because
the context in which it occurs is crucial to our understanding of
entrepreneurship,77 this nexus of entrepreneurship and institutions is
also linked to history.78 Historical analysis can “help us understand
how managers and other actors may go against prevailing practices,

70

Pacheco et al., supra note 48, at 981.
Julie Battilana et al., How Actors Change Institutions: Towards a
Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurship, 3 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 65, 66, 72
(2009).
72
Cynthia Hardy & Steve Maguire, Institutional Entrepreneurship and
Change in Fields, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALISM 261, 261 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2017).
73
See Nelson Phillips & Paul Tracey, Opportunity Recognition,
Entrepreneurial Capabilities and Bricolage: Connecting Institutional Theory and
Entrepreneurship, 3 STRATEGIC ORG. 313, 316–18 (2007).
74
Hardy & Maguire, supra note 72, at 273.
75
Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization, 13 ANN.
REV. SOC. 443, 451 (1987); accord Pacheco et al., supra note 48, at 980.
76
José María Veciana & David Urbano, The Institutional Approach to
Entrepreneurship Research: Introduction, 4 INT’L ENTREP. & MGMT. J. 365
(2008).
77
Welter & Smallbone, supra note 48, at 107.
78
R. Daniel Wadhwani, Entrepreneurship in Historical Context: Using
History to Develop Theory and Understand Process, in A RESEARCH AGENDA
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CONTEXT 65 (Friederike Welter & William B.
Gartner eds., 2016).
71

17

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

190

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:08 PM

[Vol. 31:1

break the rules-of-the game, or invent new ones”79—that is, how
actors become institutional entrepreneurs. With these connections
in mind we now turn to the analytical methods relevant to assessing
the flexibility of Chinese law, and the purposes and uses of that
flexibility by the CCP.
B. Strategy in Context and the Historical Event Sequencing
Methodology
The significance of entrepreneurship to our topic was noted
above. An equally important concept is strategy80 in that the CCP
has used flexible legal institutions at the heart of its post-Mao
survival strategy. These institutions, in turn, now set the context for
MNCs’ strategies in China.81 More specifically, the PRC’s flexible
legal institutions have enabled the CCP to maintain a competitive
advantage in institutional entrepreneurship across time.82
Studies should account for the historical embeddedness of
strategy,83 but few do.84 Historical embeddedness refers to “the
ways in which strategic processes and practices . . . are embedded in
79

Eero Vaara & Juha-Antti Lamberg, Taking Historical Embeddedness
Seriously: Three Historical Approaches to Advance Strategy Process and
Practice Research, 41 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 633, 644 (2016).
80
Strategy in the political context refers to how actors accumulate and
deploy power. ROBERT MACINTOSH & DONALD MACLEAN, STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: STRATEGISTS AT WORK 13–14 (2015). Strategy in the MNC
context concerns “how the multi-national creates value across countries[.]”
DAVID COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 4 (2014).
81
See infra Parts III, V.
82
This Paper imports several concepts from business and argues that they
are applicable in the PRC’s legal and political contexts. Competitive advantage,
for instance, is typically defined in business as the capabilities and resources that
give a firm an advantage over its rivals and that result in higher profits. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Maury, Sustainable Competitive Advantage and Profitability
Persistence: Sources versus Outcomes for Assessing Advantage, 84 J. BUS. RES.
100, 101 (2018). In this paper, the CCP’s competitive advantage refers to the
capabilities and resources that give the Party an advantage against any group that
might compete with it for power. The flexibility of the PRC’s legal system (a
resource) affords the CCP its competitive advantage in institutional
entrepreneurship (a capability).
83
See generally Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79.
84
Id. at 636.
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and defined by sociohistorical environments.”85 Strategy thus
“shapes and is shaped by its context”86 and is both enabled and
constrained by institutions.87 Even activities not traditionally seen
as “strategic” may come to be viewed as such in their historical
context.88 Hence, “analysis of historical embeddedness adds to our
understanding of the construction of organizational strategies or
their emergence in context.”89 Vaara and Lamberg “call for specific
applications of historical analysis” to questions of strategy.90 This
Paper will use event sequencing to explore the issue of institutional
entrepreneurship in the CCP’s historical context.
The strategy of any organization—including a political
one—is better understood in its historical context.91 History—like
institutions—forms a crucial element of context. Historical analysis
“can highlight how strategic practices are enacted” and “how actors
make use of them[.]”92 Answering why the PRC’s legal institutions
are so flexible will allow Part III below to illuminate the strategic
value of such institutions to the CCP, given its historical context.93
Moreover, it is in this very context that MNCs in China today find
themselves embedded, and thus, firms might approach the law
strategically through a type of embedded agency94 called legal
entrepreneurship.95 The interrelationships of these ideas and their
overlap with this Paper’s organization are depicted in Figure 1.

85

Id. at 634.
Id. at 636.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 641.
89
Id. at 649.
90
Id. at 650.
91
See generally STEVEN J. KAHL ET AL., HISTORY AND STRATEGY
(Steven J. Kahl et al., 2012).
92
Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79, at 644.
93
This is essential in China, where history has diffused strategy as a core
cultural element. HONG LIU, THE CHINESE STRATEGIC MIND 135–40 (2015).
94
Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79, at 641–42 (“By embedded agency,
we mean the historical and contextual influence exercised by top executives . . .
[over] the strategies of the organization.”).
95
See infra Part V.
86
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(2) This historical context suggested the strategic
value for the CCP of the flexible legal system later
promulgated by the Party-state (Parts II & III)

Figure 1. The interconnectedness of this paper's major themes and their overlap with the paper's organization.
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(3) MNCs and other economic agents must now account for China's pervasive
legal flexibilities in their own strategies (e.g., as legal entrepreneurs)
(future research should address this topic empirically)

MNCs & Other Firms
(legal entrepreneurship)

(4) In accounting for the PRC's flexible
formal legality in their strategies, economic
agents inform our understanding of international
legal institutions and help to shape future
historical contexts (Parts IV & V)

192

Historical context
(institutional embeddedness)

(1) Path dependent and
emergent conditions coalesce
into the historical context in
which the reformers found
themselves embedded
circa 1976-1978
(Parts II & III)
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A framework is thus needed that accounts for both
institutions and their historical context. Historical event sequencing
is a methodology for examining the processes and causes of
institutional change by taking “into account the temporal effect and
sequencing of actions.”96 The works of Sewell, Thornton et al., and
Nasra and Dacin elaborate the contours of this approach. Tracking
many tenets of institutional theory,97 William Sewell argues that
historical events are “sequences of occurrences that result in
transformations of structures” such that an event “becomes a
historical event . . . when it touches off a chain of occurrences that
durably transforms previous structures and practices.”98 Such
changes are “clustered into relatively intense bursts,” altering social
relations “in ways that could not be fully predicted from the gradual
changes that may have made them possible.”99 Some temporal
duration exists between a rupture and the resultant structural
change.100 Historical events are significant because they “[alter] the
nature of the causal nexus in which social interactions take place.”101
Sewell showed how the Bastille came to be regarded as the
watershed moment of the French Revolution,102 utilizing a

96

Rasha Nasra & M. Tina Dacin, Institutional Arrangements and
International Entrepreneurship: The State as Institutional Entrepreneur, 34
ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 583, 588 (2010); see also Thornton & Ocasio, supra
note 49, at 116–17 (defining event sequencing as “the temporal and sequential
unfolding of unique events that dislocate, rearticulate, and transform the
interpretation and meaning of cultural symbols and social and economic
structures”). Related approaches also emphasize processes across time. PAUL
PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 2–3
(2004).
97
See William H. Sewell, Jr., Historical Events as Transformations of
Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille, 25 THEORY & SOC. 841, 842
(1996).
98
Id. at 843.
99
Id. Still, institutions also change gradually. See Mahoney & Thelen,
supra note 59, at 1. Historical analysis is beneficial because “gradual . . . changes
often only ‘show up’ or ‘register’ as change if we consider a somewhat longer
timeframe[.]” Id. at 2.
100
Sewell, supra note 97, at 845.
101
Id. at 843.
102
See generally id.
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narrative103 to illustrate how the actors interpreted their context,104
how various groups worked together and why,105 and how other
powerful interests reacted to the events.106 Event sequencing
requires the reconstruction of events and actors’ interpretations from
a given rupture to the resulting institutional change.107 Sewell’s
approach is thus crucially concerned with processes. This suggests
that to understand why China adopted a system of flexible legality,
we must reconstruct the historical processes that produced the legal
system and actors’ likely interpretations of key events.108
Sewell also showed that institutional entrepreneurs are
greatly aided by the possession of legitimacy.109 Victors in a
struggle over institutions are usually those who can conflate their
position with ‘the legitimate view.’110 Events help to shape the
context in which they occur,111 and are also shaped by that
context.112 Historical events often represent acts of collective
creativity in which “new arguments [are] tried out.”113 Their effects
must sometimes be sanctioned by the state to achieve longevity.114

103

Id. Historical narratives are “reconstructions, assembled within the
virtual laboratories of [historians’] minds, of the processes that produced whatever
structure it is we’re seeking to explain . . . [W]e ask ourselves, ‘How could this
have happened?’” JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW
HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST 105 (2002).
104
Sewell, supra note 97, at 848–49.
105
Id. at 850.
106
Id. at 850–51.
107
Id. at 852.
108
See infra Part III. Historical analysis aims to identify actors’ own
contemporaneous interpretations. GADDIS, supra note 103, at 106–07.
109
Sewell, supra note 97, at 853, 856–58; see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text (defining legitimacy).
110
Sewell, supra note 97, at 859.
111
Id. at 856.
112
Id. at 862–66.
113
Id. at 867–68.
114
Id. at 874–75.
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Thornton et al., examined changes in the organizational
governance of certain industries.115 Building on Sewell,116 these
authors “theorized [historical events] as the occurrences that
dislocate, rearticulate, and transform structures,” the sequencing of
which “produces more events that reinforce or erode the dominance
of the incumbent logic.”117 The temporal and spatial ordering of
events can help to explain why they preserve, modify, or destroy
institutions. A “[h]istorical sequencing of events provides the
temporal framework to understand how structural overlap provides
access to different institutional logics and how institutional
entrepreneurs . . . turn [these logics] into actions that maintain
stability or initiate change.”118 This approach recognizes the state
as a primary actor of interest.119 Central to this work is the effect of
contextual change on the struggle between defenders of existing
institutions and their challengers:120 conflicts between institutional
defenders and attackers amount to struggles between rival sets of
institutional entrepreneurs.121 As with Sewell, legitimacy was
central to explaining institutional change.122
Political historians urge that “we must . . . bring the state
back in” because “[s]tate power matters . . . as a force for
transforming social structures[.]”123 Building, in turn, upon
Thornton et al., Nasra and Dacin applied historical event sequencing
to show how a government can act as an institutional
115

Patricia H. Thorton et al., Institutional Logics and Institutional
Change in Organizations: Transformation in Accounting, Architecture, and
Publishing, in 23 RES. IN THE SOC. OF ORGS. 125 (Candace Jones & Patricia H.
Thornton eds., 2005).
116
Id. at 130.
117
Id. The competing logics of the Maoists and reformers are detailed in
Part III.B.4, infra. See also WALDER, supra note 39, at 16 (observing that
“[p]olitical revolutions can be viewed as a contest between two organizations: the
established state and insurgent forces”).
118
Thorton et al., supra note 115, at 131.
119
Id. at 128.
120
Id. at 139, 145.
121
Id. at 146.
122
Id. at 148, 157.
123
Jon Lawrence, Political History, in WRITING HISTORY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 209, 224 (Stefan Berger et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2010) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
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entrepreneur.124 Event sequencing implies path dependence: “once
a state or political actor proceeds along a certain path, the costs of
. . . changing paths progressively increases.”125 Nasra and Dacin
explain how sequenced events facilitated Dubai’s creation of a new
legal system.126 These scholars linked resources and agency to show
that “the state [can] simultaneously create and manage multiple
institutional frameworks.”127 Dubai crafted new legal institutions to
attract foreign entrepreneurs.128
Like Nasra and Dacin’s study, the research presented here
concerns the creation of legal institutions.129 In contrast to Dubai,
however, foreign investors generally have engaged the PRC despite
its legal apparatus, and not because of it.130 Significantly, “statebusiness relations within [nondemocratic] contexts are highly
contingent on the nature of the institutional environments” in
place.131 As an institutional entrepreneur, Dubai’s chief concern
was attracting foreign investment. In contrast, while the CCP
certainly desires foreign investment,132 economic development in
China is embraced only to the extent it is perceived not to threaten
the CCP’s political monopoly.133 Following Nasra and Dacin’s
124

Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584. Nasra and Dacin’s paper is a
seminal work in entrepreneurship. Others have also characterized the PRC state
as an institutional entrepreneur. See, e.g., John Child et al., Institutional
Entrepreneurship in Building an Environmental Protection System of the
People’s Republic of China, 28 ORG. STUD. 1013 (2007).
125
Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 588.
126
Id. at 589.
127
Id. at 595.
128
Id.
129
See infra Part III.
130
YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTOCRAT’S HANDS 7–8, 44–45 (2015).
Nevertheless, PRC law can represent an asset for legal entrepreneurs. See
generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3.
131
Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584.
132
See infra Part III.
133
See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting the key assumption that
the CCP’s top priority is the preservation of its political monopoly); see also infra
Part III. Economic development undeniably is a top priority for the Party.
Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s Contribution to China’s
Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 373–75 (2014). It is
tempting, then, to simply conflate development with the Party’s survival. Part III,
infra, however, suggests that a more nuanced set of boundaries is involved. This
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approach, this Paper illustrates the nature of the CCP’s institutional
entrepreneurship “by tracking the conditions and events that have
enabled the creation of”134 the PRC’s flexible formal legality.135
In addition to event sequencing, this analysis is also
informed by widely recognized guidelines in historical studies. Of
course, just because one event happens before another does not
mean that the earlier event caused the later one.136 But effective
narrative will combine chronology with causation to show how
certain events caused later ones, or facilitated their occurrence.137
John Lewis Gaddis’ historical analytical approach couples
imagination with logic to explain today’s observable structures by
deducing the past processes that must have produced such
structures.138 This Paper seeks only to explain:139 the task of
historical analysis is to explain the past, and, unlike the social
sciences, is not to make predictions about the future.140 Hence,
historians practice “particular generalization,”141 using theory to
show how past processes produced present structures.142

argument is consistent with China’s pre-Communist experience: scholars have
noted “the primacy of central political control over the subordinated processes of
economic growth and cultural diversification” in earlier periods of Chinese
history as well. JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW
HISTORY 126–27 (2d enlarged ed. 2006).
134
Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 595.
135
See infra Part III.
136
RICHARD MARIUS & MELVIN E. PAGE, A SHORT GUIDE TO WRITING
ABOUT HISTORY 36 (9th ed. 2015).
137
WILLIAM KELLEHER STOREY, WRITING HISTORY: A GUIDE FOR
STUDENTS 94 (4th ed. 2013).
138
GADDIS, supra note 103, at 39–41. This is akin to the natural sciences
in which thought experiments substitute for laboratory experiments. Id.
139
MARIUS & PAGE, supra note 136, at 36–37.
140
GADDIS, supra note 103, at 56–60, 111–15.
141
Id. at 60–63. “Historians generalize . . . but only from the knowledge
of particular outcomes.” Id. at 66. The macro-effect resulting from innumerable
actors is difficult to predict. Id. at 74–78. A given system can contain both linear
and non-linear relationships, such that the system is “simple and complex at the
same time.” Id. at 76.
142
Id. at 60–63. “[S]ystems themselves become entangled in events,” and
thus, consistently accurate forecasting is frustrated when variables proliferate. Id.
at 65.
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Explanation is the historian’s “chief priority.”143 Like lawyers,
historians often embrace contingent, rather than categorical,
causation in which ‘it depends’ precedes an analysis.144 Thus, while
we might anticipate that the PRC’s flexible legal system will have
ongoing value to the CCP and that the CCP will attempt to preserve
this system, this Paper makes no prediction on whether it will
succeed.145
Gaddis’ guidelines for establishing causation are
noteworthy. Since there is no precise rule for when to stop tracing
the causes of an event, the ‘principle of diminishing relevance’
advises that “the greater the time that separates a cause from a
consequence, the less relevant we presume that cause to be.”146
More generally, “[c]auses always have contexts, and to know the
former we must understand the latter.”147 The historical analysis
needs “points of criticality at which stability becomes unstable”—

143

Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.
145
See BRUCE J. DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY’S STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL 1 (2016) (noting predictions of
the Party’s downfall, and that these errantly discount the Party’s adaptability)
[hereinafter THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA]; FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 6 (noting
little evidence that interest groups are affecting political reform); PITMAN B.
POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM 13–14 (2013) (noting forces promoting the
legitimacy of formal law in China). Scholars have pointed to the negative
tradeoffs for the Party of its approach to law. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman,
Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17, 27 (2009)
[hereinafter Assessing China’s Legal Reforms]; Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn
Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011); Suli Zhu, Paradoxes of Legal
Development in 20th Century China from the Perspective of Modernisation, 28
HONG KONG L.J. 429, 435–37 (1998). Still, the assumption that China will
inevitably democratize is highly suspect. See generally Gunter Schubert, OneParty Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Preliminary
Thoughts on Setting Up a New Research Agenda, 17 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 191
(2008).
146
GADDIS, supra note 103, at 96.
147
Id. at 97 “[W]hile context does not directly cause what happens, it
can certainly determine consequences.” Id. (emphasis in original).
144
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that is, “the point at which these processes took a distinctive, or
abnormal, or unforeseen course.”148
The analysis in Part III relies mostly upon secondary
historical sources.149 Other institutional works, including Nasra and
Dacin, rely solely upon secondary sources.150 While history is
central to the analysis here, the overarching purpose is to explain the
institutional evolution of the PRC’s legal regime through the
application of theory to what is already known to historians, and not
to offer an original interpretation of primary historical sources as
such. Accordingly, the Paper takes an essentially historiographical
approach to the sources underlying the analysis in Part III.151
III. EXPLAINING CHINA’S LEGAL FLEXIBILITIES
The evolution of PRC law has been tumultuous.152 The institutional
origins of the PRC’s present legal system began nearly a centuryand-a-half before its creation, and hence, the historical
circumstances surrounding its creation are vitally important to
understanding the rationale for its flexible design. Following Mao
Zedong’s death in 1976, the CCP’s reform factions gained power,153

148

Id. at 98. Or, what Gaddis describes as “punctuations in some existing
equilibrium[.]” Id. at 99–100. But see supra note 99 (discussing endogenous
institutional change).
149
In original works of history, primary sources are best. See, e.g., JIM
CULLEN, ESSAYING THE PAST: HOW TO READ, WRITE, AND THINK ABOUT
HISTORY 23–25 (3rd ed. 2013). But in wider topical treatments, secondary sources
are more prominent. ANTHONY BRUNDAGE, GOING TO THE SOURCES: A GUIDE TO
HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 25 (5th ed. 2013).
150
See Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 588–89.
151
Secondary sources “provide a broader perspective,” allowing one “to
see [events] in context.” MARY LYNN RAMPOLLA, A POCKET GUIDE TO WRITING
IN HISTORY 11 (8th ed. 2015). And in historiographical work, one can “evaluate
the viewpoints of two or more historians[.]” Id. at 40.
152
For several excellent overviews, see JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW:
CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 31–55 (2008); TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND
POLITICS OF CHINA 34–107 (3rd ed. 2011); Frederick C. Teiwes, Mao Zedong in
Power (1949-1976), in POLITICS IN CHINA 63–102 (William A. Joseph ed., 2nd
ed. 2010).
153
See infra Parts III.B.4, III.C.
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and it was these ‘reformers’154 who constructed a new legal system
during the 1980’s and 1990’s.155 The flexibility of the PRC’s legal
system has been attributed to many factors, including its relative
newness.156 While these factors also encouraged the PRC’s legal
flexibility, another fundamental force was at work: PRC law is
intended to serve several strategic purposes, simultaneously
shaping the PRC’s broader environment and promoting the CCP’s
political monopoly.157 Legal flexibility is a strategic asset for the
CCP.158 Before exploring in detail why the present system was
designed in this manner, however, we first clarify how flexibility
permeates Chinese law.
A. How Flexibility Defines the Modern Chinese Legal System
Mao’s successors constructed the PRC legal system with
their own priorities in mind. Like China’s previous rulers, the
reformers had discovered the advantages of legal flexibility and
154

DREYER, supra note 36, at 113–14 (noting that “[t]hose who preferred
to break sharply with the Maoist past are generally termed reformers”).
155
Jerome A. Cohen, Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East
Asia and the Road Ahead for China, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 423, 423–24
(2005); accord JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 705
(1990) [hereinafter THE SEARCH].
156
See, e.g., Leontine D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China’s
Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign
Investment in China, 20 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 509, 523–24 (2000).
157
See, e.g., Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Continuing
Commitment to the Primacy of State Power, 159 CHINA Q. 673, 673 (1999). The
“PRC legal system reflects the commitment of the Chinese Communist Party to
maintaining its monopoly on political power.” Id. at 673; accord Sarah Biddulph,
The Production of Legal Norms: A Case Study of Administrative Detention in
China, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 217, 274 (2003) (discussing the Legislation Law
as an example); see also supra text accompanying note 37.
158
Nara Dillon, Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary
Methods to Serve Post–Communist Goals, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 138, 157
(Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011). This is distinguishable from
other contexts in which states have used “strategic ambiguity.” See, e.g., Jeffrey
Adam Sachs, “Native Courts” and the Limits of the Law in Colonial Sudan:
Ambiguity as Strategy, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 973 (2013). More generally,
some flexibility can actually promote an institution’s stability. Claus Offe,
Designing Institutions in East European Transitions, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 199, 209 (1996).
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were content to retain it.159 Thus, “[f]lexibility is a key element of
the [PRC] legal system,”160 reflecting a dichotomy between the
formal law (as stated officially) and the law in practice (as
applied).161
PRC law retains this flexibility by design,162
functioning largely to define the parameters within which lowerlevel officials may act.163
Peter Howard Corne’s seminal book on China’s
administrative apparatus, Foreign Investment in China,164 stresses
the prominence of legal flexibility. “China has opted for a legal
system that is in essence as fluid and changeable as the economy
and society which it is supposed to regulate . . . [L]aws are
159

Franz Michael, The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist and
Communist China, 9 CHINA Q. 124, 143–47 (1962) (illustrating some advantages
of flexibility); accord HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT,
WHEN, HOW 125 (1950). In contrast to the USSR, the PRC favored extreme
fluidity in the 1960s. JOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 100
(1969). The PRC’s system of administrative specification, discussed in Part III.A,
mimics a somewhat similar imperial system. See R. Randle Edwards, The Role of
Case Precedent in the Qing Judicial Process as Reflected in Appellate Rulings, in
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 180, 180–81 (C. Stephen Hsu ed.,
2003); PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 104 (1997).
160
Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, supra note 145, at 28; accord
David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Institutional Foundations for the Chinese
Market Economy: The State, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 455, 459 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013).
161
William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal
System, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JEROME A. COHEN 7, 35–36 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003); Evans & Gabel, supra
note 3, at 372, 377–78.
162
Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical
Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 165, 172 (Sebastian
Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011).
163
CORNE, supra note 159. Examples of flexibility and uncertainty in
Chinese law are cited often in Western law literature, see, e.g., Rongjie Lan, A
False Promise of Fair Trials: A Case Study of China’s Malleable Criminal
Procedure Law, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 153 (2010); Wu Xiaofeng, Comment,
An Analysis of Wrongful Convictions in China, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 451,
461, 465 (2011); Mei Ning Yan, China and the Prior Consent Requirement: A
Decade of Invasion and Counter–Invasion by Transfrontier Satellite Television,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265, 302 n.160 (2003).
164
See generally CORNE, supra note 159.
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intentionally made ambiguous to enable flexibility in interpretation
and implementation.”165 Flexibility and ambiguity do not merely
exist in the contemporary PRC legal system; they define the
contemporary PRC legal system.
Flexible law is ideologically palatable in the PRC because it
is “consistent with socialism.”166 But more than philosophy is at
work because the CCP enjoys a nearly unlimited range of options to
shape or respond to societal developments, and all of its actions
plausibly can be described as consistent with the law (and therefore,
as legitimate).167 One official summarized that “law should not be
too specific lest it tie our hands and feet in the face of the rapidly
changing situation.”168 The CCP’s hope is to maintain its flexibility
without sacrificing its legitimacy or social stability.169 The resultant
law-making process is known as administrative specification.170
Statutes, beginning as high as the National People’s
Congress, pronounce policies in deliberately broad language,
serving “to provide only a thumbnail sketch of the parameters of
regulation.”171 Legal drafting is characterized by calculated
vagueness and ambiguity, undefined terms, broadly worded
discretions, omissions, principle-like pronouncements, and general
165

Id. at 94; accord Corne, supra note 7, at 376–78. Chinese legal
flexibility serves to decouple China’s external goals from its internal ones. See
infra Part III.C. Authoritarians decouple by giving the impression of public
involvement, while “denying tangible policy authority and squelching
independent political activity in practice.” See Dan Slater, Altering
Authoritarianism, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 132, 134–135 (James
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010).
166
CORNE, supra note 159, at 93–94.
167
Id. at 94.
168
Gao Xi-Ching, Today's Legal Thinking and Its Economic Impact in
China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 113 (1989) (quoting Wang Hanbin’s
March 7, 1985 speech).
169
See infra Part III.C.
170
“Administrative specification is the process by which law and
regulations are interpreted, at one level, by State Council departments, and at
another level, by local people’s congresses and administrative bodies which apply
them to local reality.” CORNE, supra note 159, at 104. Otherwise stated,
“[a]dministrative specification is the process by which principle-like laws are
narrowed down through a succession of enactments so that they can be applied to
local reality.” Id. at 105.
171
Id. at 95.
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catch-all phrases.172 Lower-level people’s congresses likewise
enact statutes with these features.
Once a statute is promulgated, administrative bodies such as
the State Council—the PRC’s national executive body—create
rules, interpretations or even informal ‘normative documents’ to
build upon the statute in question.173 This process cascades
downward, as each successively lower level of the state ‘specifies’
higher-order laws, creating more specific artifacts.174 Of course, by
the time this cascade reaches the bottom rungs of the state, myriad
variations appear in the laws across localities. But this diversity is
deemed both a natural result of specification and an affirmative
good.175 The specification process empowers local officials to apply
national policies to their particular circumstances—in theory, to best

172

Id. Others have similarly noted that PRC statutes are conspicuously
ambiguous—to such an extent that the importance and difficulty of statutory
interpretation are greatly heightened. See, e.g., Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice
in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 110 (2017) (noting that the PRC Supreme
People’s Court engages in statutory interpretation “frequently since most Chinese
statutes are too vague and ambiguous to apply directly”). Still other scholars have
discussed at length the ambiguities in particular PRC statutes. See, e.g., Deng
Ruiping & Duan Xiaosong, Promoting Impartiality of International Commercial
Arbitrators Through Chinese Criminal Law: Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”,
10 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 109, 125 (2014) (discussing the 2006
amendments to the PRC Criminal Law and noting that “the Chinese statute is
ambiguous”); Gregory Hwa, Breaking Out of the West, Advancing into Asia:
Cultural Considerations for Brand Management in China, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 399, 399–400 (2015) (noting that recent amendments to the PRC “trademark
statute have created substantial ambiguity as to how, and if any, safeguards
against infringement will actually apply”); Wei Wen, How American Common
Law Doctrines May Inform Mainland China to Achieve Certainty in Land Sale
Contracts, 17 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 2, 17–20 (2015) (discussing ambiguities
in PRC contract and real property laws in the context of land sales).
173
CORNE, supra note 159, at 104–05.
174
Id. at 93–145 (discussing flexibility in the law’s creation); id. at 189–
242 (discussing flexibility in implementation). For more on legal artifacts, see
Luka Burazin, Can There be an Artifact Theory of Law?, 29 RATIO JURIS 385
(2016) (characterizing laws as institutional artifacts in that they owe their
existence to human activities and require collective intentionality).
175
See CORNE, supra note 159, at 126, 147; accord Peter K. Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the
U.S.–China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 36–37 (2001).
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serve the CCP’s interests in each place.176 It also encourages
stakeholders to bargain peacefully within existing institutions,
expressing themselves without rebelling against the institutional
order.177 A given statute, rule, regulation or interpretation must be
consistent with statements of higher-level authorities and with any
applicable CCP policies, which may or may not have been made
public.178
Earlier, ‘flexible legal institutions’ were defined as those
whose meanings and applications are substantially open to question.
Accordingly, those who encounter flexible institutions experience
uncertainty as to the institutions’ precise meanings, the implications
of such institutions for their actions, and even whether the
institutions in question apply to them.179 Three types of flexibility—
substantive, enforcement, and systemic—exist to some degree in
every legal system.180 The laws of most nations are reduced to
writing.
When that writing contains gaps or ambiguities,
substantive flexibilities arise.181 Substantive flexibilities impose
uncertainties on regulated parties by failing to specify easily and
comprehensively the meanings and applications of the rules
delineated in official, written form.182 PRC law today contains high
degrees of substantive flexibility, as when a statute or administrative
rule is rife with the vagueness or ambiguity, undefined terms,
176

“Legal fragmentation is an essential part of China’s political
system[.]” YONGNIAN ZHENG, CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A HISTORY SINCE 1978,
at 140 (2014); accord Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The
Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995).
177
See, e.g., Philip C.C. Huang, Divorce Law Practices and the Origins,
Myths, and Realities of Judicial ‘Mediation’ in China, 31 MOD. CHINA 151, 175–
80 (2005) (discussing divorce law and mediation as means to resolve conflicts and
thereby disincentivize opposition to the law itself); see also Lan, supra note 8, at
426 (noting that legal ambiguity accommodates competing visions and thus
discourages overt conflicts between them).
178
See generally Corne, supra note 7 (discussing secretive laws in
China); see also Sebastian Heilmann & Nicole Schulte-Kulkman, The Limits of
Policy Diffusion: Introducing International Norms of Anti-Money Laundering
into China’s Legal System, 24 GOVERNANCE 639, 653 (2011).
179
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
180
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 371–82.
181
Id. at 372–77.
182
Id.
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broadly
worded
discretions,
omissions,
principle-like
pronouncements, or general catch-all phrases that are common in
written Chinese laws.183
Additionally, to the extent that variations or inconsistencies
exist in the enforcement of laws, enforcement flexibilities exist.184
Enforcement flexibilities impose uncertainties by raising doubts as
to which rules will actually carry the force of law in practice under
various circumstances, times, and places.185 The PRC legal system
exhibits considerable enforcement flexibilities; the country’s
intellectual property laws provide a high-profile example.186
Finally, the law is a process, consisting of numerous subparts
interacting with one another.187 Interactions between the constituent
parts of the rule of law process, the legal system’s interactions with
the extra-legal forces of its environment, and complexities arising
from such internal features as the number and nature of rule-makers,
all generate systemic flexibilities.188 This type of flexibility can
multiply and amplify the frequency and degree to which regulated
parties experience legal uncertainty, whether in conjunction with or
independent of the other types of legal flexibility. In the PRC, the
state apparatus is pervaded by unclear boundaries of authority and
myriad rule makers exist at all levels of the state. These bureaucratic
units often act without a clear basis of authority and the resulting
legal norms compete and conflict with one another.189
Because these three forms of legal flexibility pervade
China’s legal system, the PRC can be characterized as a ‘low rule of
183

See supra Part III.A.
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 377–80.
185
Id.
186
Although the PRC has recently established specialized courts to
address the enforcement of intellectual property, see Daniel C. Fleming,
Counterfeiting in China, 10 U. Pᴀ. E. ASIA L. REV. 14, 29–30 (2015), significant
variations persist in practice, see, e.g., JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, 2 CHINA LAW
DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 665–68 (4th
ed. 2014). More generally, “[l]egal implementation in the PRC tends to be ad hoc,
haphazard and lacking in consistency.” CORNE, supra note 159, at 189.
187
See Zhu, supra note 145, at 432.
188
Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 380–82.
189
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 188–93 (2nd ed., 2003).
184
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law’ jurisdiction that often fails to promote easy predictability for
regulated parties.190 The uncertainties emanating from these
flexibilities tend to discourage rather than empower economic
actors.191 Given the importance of economic activity for China’s
social stability and for the Party’s own interests, the question arises
why the Party has elected for such a flexible institutional
arrangement. History and institutional theory afford new insights
into this question, to which we now turn.
B. Event Sequencing: Explaining China’s Legal Flexibility
The arrangement described above seems counterintuitive:
while economic growth remains a high priority for the CCP,192 the
PRC’s legal institutions are plainly inconsistent with the
prescription of growth facilitated by legal clarity and certainty.193
Informal institutions contribute to the PRC’s success,194 but cannot
substitute altogether for formal ones.195 Since “law is . . .

190

See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 336 (defining high rule of law
jurisdictions as those with “transparent legal systems that empower firms to plan
and act in the economic realm” and, in contrast, low rule of law jurisdictions as
those “where opaque legal systems create economic uncertainties and risks”);
accord id. at 382–87 (discussing these terms in the context of the three types of
legal flexibility); see also supra note 4 (drawing this distinction).
191
See supra Part I.
192
See infra Part III.C.
193
See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 350–56 (discussing the
Normative Coase Theorem and related ideas).
194
For more on the impact of informal institutions, see generally Qingxiu
Bu, Will Chinese Legal Culture Constrain Its Corporate Governance-Related
Laws?, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 103 (2015); KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT
DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007); LILY L.
TSAI, ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: SOLIDARY GROUPS AND PUBLIC
GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA (2007); Lan, supra note 8.
195
See generally Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions
in Economic Development, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2008); accord Lan, supra
note 8, at 421–23, 426 (noting that while informal institutions can substitute for
formal ones in certain instances, these situations create problems and thus, formal
institutions are often needed). And even where interests (like property) can be
secured informally, this usually imposes far greater transaction costs than do
formal rules.
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inseparable from the state,”196 more is needed to understand why the
CCP came to favor such a flexible legal regime. The PRC’s legal
flexibility did not come about by accident or solely by path
dependence.197 This section employs historical event sequencing to
better understand the CCP’s choice of a highly flexible legal
system.198
Most of China’s long history is too remote to map its
influence in the creation of the flexible legal system that currently
exists.199 Therefore, the examination of Chinese legal evolution will
begin with the first Opium War.200 Between the start of this conflict
in 1839 and the ascension of the reformers in 1978, two parallel
sequences of events defined China’s experience: first, a chain of
immensely disruptive and traumatic calamities imposed by foreign
196

Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, in
THE RULE OF LAW 115, 119 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971).
197
See AN CHEN, RESTRUCTURING POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA:
ALLIANCE & OPPOSITION 1978–1998, at 157–58 (1999); Slater, supra note 165, at
164. In institutional theory, path dependence seeks to explain why
institutionalization occurs (that is, why institutions become entrenched over time).
More specifically, path dependence refers to the effects of positive feedback, such
that “[f]urther developments in the same direction are rewarded, whereas the costs
of switching to an alternative increase over time.” See SCOTT, supra note 26, at
144-45. More formally, “[a]s a theoretical framework, path dependence provides
an explanation for potentially problematic long-term outcomes that deliberately
decentralizes agency by referring to a system logic of self-reinforcing processes
triggered by contingent events.” Leonhard Dobusch & Elke Schüßler, Theorizing
Path Dependence: A Review of Positive Feedback Mechanisms in Technology
Markets, Regional Clusters, and Organizations, 22 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 617,
618 (2012). Path dependence “implies that history matters in the long-term
evolution of” economies, political systems, and so forth. A. Jakimowicz, Path
Dependence in Neoclassical Economic Growth Theory, 127 ACTA PHYSICA
POLONICA A-86, A-86 (2015). In the present context, path dependence would
imply that the flexibility of China’s legal system was ‘inherited’ as an inevitable
consequence of certain historical factors that had persisted across time. This Paper
argues, however, that China’s legal flexibility was introduced by strategic design,
more so than by historical happenstance.
198
See supra Part II.B (discussing event sequencing).
199
See GADDIS, supra note 103 (noting the “principle of diminishing
relevance”).
200
Others also designate the first Opium War as the start of China’s
modern history. See, e.g., ROBERT BICKERS, THE SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA: FOREIGN
DEVILS IN THE QING EMPIRE, 1832–1914, at 10 (2011).

35

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

208

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:08 PM

[Vol. 31:1

powers during China’s ‘Century of Humiliation,’ and second, a
series of equally scarring misfortunes instigated within China.
Following Nasra and Dacin, the analysis segments the relevant
historical events into different time periods and traces the major
events and the status of the legal system in each. Figure 2 depicts
the most salient events, which are discussed throughout the
remainder of this section.
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Figure 2. Event Sequencing: China's modern history as the context for its contemporary legal system.
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The PRC has utilized history to shape its institutions.
History is also central to how Westerners view China. Robert
Bickers states that “[w]e cannot understand the resurgence of China
now, and its . . . anger at the world, unless we understand the
traumatic century which followed the first opium war . . . For mere
history matters in modern China, and the past is unfinished
business.”201 Below, the Paper tracks the major events of China’s
recent history (what institutional theory calls its “critical junctures”)
to interpret the influences that shaped the reformers who would
eventually enact China’s contemporary legal system. This history
masks the shrewdness that enabled the reformers first to seize power
and then to retain it against seemingly long odds. Their principal
weapon of choice in these struggles was institutional
entrepreneurship—the very competency in which the reformers
sought to establish an enduring competitive advantage for the CCP.
To explain, then, why the PRC’s reformers opted for a flexible
formal legal system, we begin by examining the final decades of
China’s last imperial dynasty—the Qing.
1.

Final years of the Qing (1839–1912)

Commerce between China and England flourished in the
1700s.202 The British had accommodated China’s “Canton
system,”203 but subsequently began agitating for broader access to
Chinese markets.204 By the 1830s, relations between China and
foreign merchants had been strained for some fifty years, and
various cultural factors heightened these tensions.205 Qing law
201

Id.
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 195.
203
See id. (“[A]fter 1759 Guangzhou (Canton) was made the sole port
open for Europeans.”).
204
JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WAR: DRUGS, DREAMS, AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN CHINA 78 (2011).
205
Cultural factors heightened these tensions. W. TRAVIS HANES III &
FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION OF ONE EMPIRE AND THE
CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 13 (2002). Westerners viewed China as an “alien,
hostile nation[.]” LOVELL, supra note 204, at 80. The Chinese, for their part,
labeled foreigners ‘barbarians.’ PETER WARD FAY, THE OPIUM WAR 1840–1842,
202
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played a visible role as Westerners pressed for special legal
privileges, and Qing citizens resented perceived concessions.206 The
impetus for the first Opium War involved a dispute of access:
“British merchants wanted to sell their goods . . . along the eastern
coast” while “the Qing . . . wanted to confine trade to Canton and
ban opium.”207 Opium produced in India was shipped to China,208
where its sale generated large revenue flows for the British, but
resulted in high rates of addiction and a massive outflow of silver as
payment.209 When the Qing government halted the drug’s sale in
1839, in part by destroying foreigners’ inventories, the British navy
attacked.210 China had not industrialized211 and was soon overrun,
resulting in the one-sided Treaty of Nanjing in 1842.212 Additional
‘unequal treaties’ soon followed as the U.S., France, Russia and
others extracted concessions213 including rights to impose their laws

at 30–31 (1997). See also JOHN KEAY, CHINA: A HISTORY 446–49 (2009)
(describing George Macartney’s efforts to open China for the British in 1793);
JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS OF BEIJING: GLOBAL CURRENTS IN
CHINESE HISTORY 137 (2000) (discussing Chinese jurisdiction over foreigners
prior to the Opium War).
206
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 123–28. Legal issues within and
between China and Britain were immensely influential in Britain’s decision to go
to war. See LI CHEN, CHINESE LAW IN IMPERIAL EYES: SOVEREIGNTY, JUSTICE,
AND TRANSCULTURAL POLITICS 201–42 (2016).
207
LOVELL, supra note 204, at 78.
208
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 198–99.
209
Id.; accord JONATHAN FENBY, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF MODERN
CHINA: THE FALL AND RISE OF A GREAT POWER 1850 TO THE PRESENT 14–15 (2nd
ed. 2013) [hereinafter THE PENGUIN HISTORY].
210
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 200.
211
DREYER, supra note 36, at 42–45; see also JUSTIN YIFU LIN,
DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 1 (2012) (attributing China’s defeat to its
weak economy and inability to fund a stronger military).
212
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 200.
213
Id. at 201–05.
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extraterritorially.214 These nations effectively colonized China215
and successfully pursued institutional entrepreneurship even as the
Qing Empire imploded.216 Such indignities began China’s ‘Century
of Humiliation,’ which lasted from the 1840s to the 1940s.217 These
events remain politically relevant even today.218
The closing decades of Qing history were set against this
backdrop. Anti-British violence219 and rebellions220 erupted.
Several treaties were renegotiated,221 and as Japan defeated China

214

For example, Congress created a United States Court for China that
sat in Shanghai and exercised jurisdiction over Americans there. Teemu Ruskola,
Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S.
Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2008); see also ZIMMERMAN,
supra note 186, at 47–56 (discussing the United States’ extraterritorial
jurisdiction). Nineteen countries ultimately secured extraterritorial privileges in
China. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 186, at 48–49 n.17.
215
See generally BICKERS, supra note 200; see also DREYER, supra note
36, at 47-53; KEAY, supra note 205, at 490–91; JONATHAN SPENCE, THE CHINA
HELPERS 215 (1969) (discussing Nationalists’ discontent with foreign military
presence) [hereinafter THE CHINA HELPERS]; WALEY-COHEN, supra note 205, at
167 (“Even though China had not become a formal colony . . . its independence
seemed to have become a dead letter” by 1911); Benj. H. Williams, The Protection
of American Citizens in China: Extraterritoriality, 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 49–53
(1922) (noting resentment among Chinese citizenry of foreign tribunals and
observing that “[e]xtraterritoriality is a distinct impairment of sovereignty”).
216
See, e.g., HANS VAN DE VEN, BREAKING WITH THE PAST: THE
MARITIME CUSTOMS SERVICE AND THE GLOBAL ORIGINS OF MODERNITY IN
CHINA 134 (2014) (discussing the transition of China’s Maritime Customs Service
into “a debt-collection agency for foreign bondholders”).
217
FLEMMING CHRISTIANSEN & SHIRIN RAI, CHINESE POLITICS AND
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 27–80 (1996); see generally DAVID SCOTT, CHINA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1840–1949 (2008).
218
In an effort to promote the Party’s legitimacy, CCP leaders have kept
the Century of Humiliation at the forefront of public memory. Alison A. Kaufman,
The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the
International Order, 25 PAC. AFF. 1 (2010); Randall Peerenboom, China Stands
Up: 100 Years of Humiliation, Sovereignty Concerns, and Resistance to Foreign
Pressure on PRC Courts, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 653, 654–56 (2010); ZHENG
WANG, NEVER FORGET NATIONAL HUMILIATION: HISTORICAL MEMORY IN
CHINESE POLITICS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS (2012).
219
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 162.
220
Id. at 170–78, 184–93.
221
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 201.
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in a war to control Korea in 1894-95,222 Chinese nationalism rose
sharply.223 The empire flirted with acquiring Western technology,
but when exposure to Western thought induced an anti-authoritarian
sentiment in Chinese students sent to the U.S. for education, Qing
officials suspended further exchanges.224 In 1898, Empress Cixi
stifled the progressives’ attempts at reform, but by 1901 the need for
legal reform was apparent.225 The Empress asked senior officials to
compare Chinese governmental and legal systems with those of the
West and to recommend adaptations.226 It was only in this brief
interlude that Qing officials embraced commercial law as a means
to restore China’s economic sovereignty and to end
extraterritoriality.227 By 1908, officials were laying the groundwork
for a constitutional monarchy,228 but the empire fell before
substantial changes could be implemented.229 Conservatives
reinstalled themselves and rejected all changes to the imperial
system.230
Although Qing officials viewed the economy strategically,
they regulated it mostly ineffectually.231 Significantly, private

222

THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 222–24; see also KEAY, supra note
205, at 484–89 (discussing how Japan’s modernization had greatly exceeded
China’s).
223
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 230–38.
224
See YONG ZHAO, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON?: WHY
CHINA HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD 71–92
(2014).
225
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 224–27.
226
HAROLD M. TANNER, CHINA: A HISTORY 406–07 (2009).
227
William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and
Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995).
228
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 246.
229
PÄR KRISTOFFER CASSEL, GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND IMPERIAL POWER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA
AND JAPAN 175–76 (2012).
230
Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement, in 2 SOURCES OF CHINESE
TRADITION 260, 263 (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Richard Lufrano eds., 1999)
(noting that “[s]upporters of [Qing] rule [would] resist any . . . tampering with its
institutions”); TANNER, supra note 226, at 409 (noting that conservatives rose in
“storms of opposition” even to “seemingly small” changes.).
231
Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt, Introduction, in TO ACHIEVE
SECURITY AND WEALTH 1, 2–3 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 1992).
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entrepreneurs and their guilds became extremely powerful,
displacing many local Qing governments as the source of power.232
This state of affairs taught future CCP leaders to be weary of power
derived from private wealth.233 The Qing’s legitimacy was
undermined by the sense that “China’s destiny now [laid] in the
hands of foreigners who bore her little goodwill,”234 and by the
state’s own persistent inadaptability.235 In 1912, the last emperor
was ousted and the Republic of China was established236—but the
optimism greeting this occasion was soon dispelled, as China
descended into a period of extraordinary violence from 1912 to
1950.237

The Maoists would later view this degree of economic autonomy as a national
weakness. See infra Parts III.B.3, III.B.4.
232
JONATHAN FENBY, MODERN CHINA: THE RISE AND FALL OF A GREAT
POWER, 1850 TO THE PRESENT 150–51 (2008) [hereinafter MODERN CHINA];
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 148–49 (1982); R. KEITH
SCHOPPA, REVOLUTION AND ITS PAST: IDENTITIES AND CHANGE IN MODERN
CHINESE HISTORY 150–51 (3rd ed. 2011); RICHARD VON GLAHN, THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF CHINA: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 395 (2016).
The Qing relied upon guilds to deliver services. Andrea McElderry, Guarantors
and Guarantees in Qing Government-Business Relations, in TO ACHIEVE
SECURITY AND WEALTH 119, 128–30 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds.,
1992); Christine Moll-Murata, Chinese Guilds from the Seventeenth to the
Twentieth Centuries: An Overview, 53 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 213, 219 (2008).
But in conferring legitimacy, the Qing unwittingly invited the guilds to compete
with the state for power. WELLINGTON K.K. CHAN, MERCHANTS, MANDARINS,
AND MODERN ENTERPRISE IN LATE CH’ING CHINA 234 (1977). One suspects that
China’s corporatist approach heeds these historical lessons. See generally
Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, State Corporatism and Business Associations in
China, 10 INT’L J. EMERGING MKTS. 178 (2015).
233
See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST
PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE SECTOR 238 (2008) (discussing the
Party’s cooptation of capitalists, who now defend Party rule) [hereinafter
WEALTH INTO POWER]; see also infra Part III.C.
234
RANA MITTER, A BITTER REVOLUTION: CHINA’S STRUGGLE WITH THE
MODERN WORLD 35 (2004).
235
Id. at 37.
236
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 267.
237
KEAY, supra note 205, at 499–500.
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During this period, China’s legal system reflected its longstanding historical features,238 aligned with Confucian mores239
such that “the law was . . . but a tool of administration in general.”240
Western powers had imposed extraterritoriality because they viewed
Chinese law as “barbaric.”241 Local magistrates rigidly applied
Chinese criminal codes.242 The institutional status of law clearly
varied between China and the West. However, officials eventually
endorsed reform as the only hope for the Qing’s survival,243 and
institutions free from the state’s control had begun to emerge in
response.244
Yet China’s bureaucratic inertia nevertheless
prevailed—this time, at the cost of the regime itself.245
2.

Republic of China (1912–1949)

The Kuomintang (“KMT”), or Nationalist Party, emerged
victorious in China’s first election in 1913.246 Following a failed

238

See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA
AFTER MAO 23 (1999) (noting that Qing law was addressed to officials and not to
the public); THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 123–28 (discussing the status of
foreigners under Qing law); see FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 155,
183–86 (discussing pre-Qing and Qing laws, respectively).
239
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 184.
240
Id. at 185.
241
SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 57.
242
“If a socially undesirable act did not correspond exactly to one of the
Qing Code’s precisely-defined offenses, a magistrate could punish it by analogy
to an existing offense or under the rule which” provided punishments for
“[e]veryone who does that which ought not to be done[.]” TANNER, supra note
226, at 357.
243
See e.g., Kang Youwei, Memorial on Institutional Reform, in
SOURCES IN CHINESE HISTORY 100–01 (David G. Atwill & Yurong Y. Atwill eds.,
2010); THE CHINA HELPERS, supra note 215, at 156.
244
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 257.
245
The reformers took this lesson seriously. The USSR later fell in part
because it faced an entrenched bureaucracy opposed to economic reforms (much
like the Qing), and thus, the USSR was forced to introduce political reforms
together with economic ones. See SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 333–34 (1993). In contrast, the reformers’
flexibility enabled economic reforms with far fewer political reforms. Id.
246
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 280. Even so, the early
revolutionaries could not articulate their own logics. See DAVID STRAND, AN
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attempt by the provisional president and Nationalist rival Yuan
Shikai to make himself emperor,247 the KMT came to dominate the
Republican government. Yuan’s monarchical efforts diminished the
possibility of democracy in China.248 From Yuan’s death in 1916
until the KMT’s Northern Expedition ended in 1928, local warlords
who ruled small fiefdoms with personal armies controlled most of
China.249
Foreign states continued to antagonize China, giving rise to
the May Fourth Movement following World War I.250 The
Versailles Treaty transferred German colonies in China to Japan,
rather than back to China.251 The May Fourth Movement presaged
China’s twentieth-century history252 through the ideas that
emerged.253 A consensus among intellectuals arose “that traditional
Chinese culture . . . was largely to blame”254 for China’s lack of
sovereignty, finding fault in Confucianism.255 The Movement
combined elements that previously existed only separately: “a sense
of real and impending crisis, a combination of . . . ideas aimed at
‘saving the nation’, and an audience ready to receive, welcome,
contest, and adapt these ideas.”256 The KMT failed to articulate a
credible new set of logics, even as the public rejected many longstanding assumptions.
This was a missed opportunity for
institutional entrepreneurship and, ironically, Chinese intellectuals
turned to other countries for inspiration. Among the foreign

UNFINISHED REPUBLIC: LEADING BY WORD AND DEED IN MODERN CHINA 55
(2011).
247
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 283–87.
248
See THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 125–38 (discussing
Yuan’s rise to the presidency and actions inconsistent with democracy).
249
TANNER, supra note 226, at 429–31.
250
MITTER, supra note 234, at 37.
251
Id. at 3.
252
Id. at 4, 11; accord ALAN LAWRANCE, CHINA SINCE 1919:
REVOLUTION AND REFORM 1 (2004).
253
MITTER, supra note 234, at 13. The CCP’s first generation of leaders
came of age in this era. KEAY, supra note 205, at 504.
254
MITTER, supra note 234, at 14–15.
255
Id. at 18.
256
Id. at 23.
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concepts that gained traction in this climate were Marxism and
Communism.257
The CCP’s founding in 1921 was thus undertaken amidst
great social turbulence.258 The CCP positioned itself rhetorically as
the solution to warlord rule.259 Because the Republic and the USSR
collaborated in the 1920s,260 and since the KMT and CCP shared the
goal of unifying China,261 the two groups were tenuously allied
through the start of the Northern Expedition—the KMT’s largely
successful military effort to remove the warlords and thereby
reunify the country. 262 But this alliance, known as the First United
Front, disintegrated quickly when United Front forces retook
Shanghai: the KMT blamed the Communists for civil unrest and
cracked down on left-wing organizations.263 For its part, at the
behest of the Soviets, the CCP began insurrections in 1927; the
Nationalists expelled Communists from government offices,264 and
the Chinese Civil War was thereby inaugurated.265 Until 1937, the
KMT controlled most of China’s urban centers and held the
advantage as its military pursued and nearly destroyed Communist
forces. The CCP elicited support covertly in the cities as well as in
the countryside,266 aiding peasant associations and establishing an
agrarian regime called the Jiangxi Soviet.267 A turning point
occurred when Japan, which had seized Manchuria in 1931,268

257

THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 305–10, 319–25.
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 275–78.
259
See First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation (June 15,
1922), in SOURCES IN CHINESE HISTORY 176 (David G. Atwill & Yurong Y.
Atwill eds., 2010).
260
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 336.
261
Id.
262
TANNER, supra note 226, at 459.
263
J.A.G. ROBERTS, THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINA 371–72 (2003).
264
Id. at 372–73; accord MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 167–96
(detailing the tensions leading to the breakdown of the First United Front).
265
TANNER, supra note 226, at 460–63.
266
Id. at 463–73.
267
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 345, 355–57, 370–79.
268
THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 229–43.
258
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initiated a full invasion of China in 1937.269 Japan’s aggression
would prove disastrous for the Nationalists. 270
The KMT’s weaknesses were exposed as it struggled to
retain control even of the regions outside of Japan’s conquest.271
Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT’s ruler, regarded the CCP as the greater
threat, and his allocation of resources against the Communists
eroded his popular support,272 particularly as the Japanese carried
out atrocities against Chinese civilians.273 Chiang eventually agreed
to a ceasefire with the CCP—the Second United Front—so that both
could combat the Japanese; however, this truce was quickly undone,
and the Communists’ popularity in China’s rural areas surged.274 In
institutional terms, the Communists were not merely providing
governmental services in the areas they controlled; they were
winning converts to their ideology and asserting new logics, acting
as institutional entrepreneurs.275 Upon Japan’s defeat in 1945, the
Civil War resumed—this time with a weakened KMT military and
a strengthened Communist force.276 Although worsening economic
conditions did not immediately help the Communist cause,277 the
CCP’s support continued to grow as it implemented rural land
269

FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 312.
It is ironic that the CCP benefitted from the aggression of the fiercely
anti-communist Japanese. THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 229.
271
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 314. The KMT’s
conscriptions, for instance, were unpopular, and the KMT was blamed for China’s
wartime famines. Id. at 314–16.
272
WALEY-COHEN, supra note 205, at 232–33.
273
See, e.g., SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 261–63.
274
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 316. China’s regions were
unevenly developed, affording the CCP the chance to attract rural support. ODD
ARNE WESTAD, RESTLESS EMPIRE: CHINA AND THE WORLD SINCE 1750, at 176
(2012).
275
Various works have assessed the CCP’s rural appeal. See, e.g., EDGAR
SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 267–71 (1961) (describing one Nationalist won
over by the CCP’s efforts).
276
See JAY TAYLOR, THE GENERALISSIMO: CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR MODERN CHINA 321–77 (2009). “The eight-year war with Japan
had been an extended body-blow for a regime [the KMT] already shot through
with weaknesses.” JONATHAN FENBY, CHIANG KAI SHEK: CHINA’S
GENERALISSIMO AND THE NATION HE LOST 460 (2003) [hereinafter CHIANG KAI
SHEK].
277
TAYLOR, supra note 276, at 369.
270
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reforms278 while Nationalist policies did little to improve the
agrarian livelihood.279 The KMT was also plagued by corruption
and incompetence. The KMT’s many missteps, coupled with the
CCP’s strategy of building a power base in the rural areas, moved
the public’s ‘collective memory’280 to accept and validate the
Maoists’ institutional logics.281 The Republic had delayed its fall
through nationalism and alliances with other troubled states,282 but
the CCP nevertheless overran the KMT, and Mao declared the
founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949.283
The KMT had modeled its legal system on Western
examples,284 but the Republican period is noteworthy for how little
the law actually functioned in light of extraterritoriality and the
KMT’s conflicts with the warlords, Japan, and the Communists—
suggesting that even when they were militarily successful, the
Nationalists were ineffective institutional entrepreneurs.
Contemporary observers noted that the Nationalists’ “enlightened”
law was seldom observed in practice.285 Nevertheless, this era
contributed to the historical context in which the designers of
China’s contemporary legal system were embedded. China
internationalized under the Republic as foreigners encouraged a
capitalist bent.286 It is notable that during the Republic, as in the
Qing era, guilds and other economic elites were able to displace
local governments and formal law.287
278

See, e.g., THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 491 (discussing land reform
and the Manchurian base).
279
RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 97.
280
See William Ocasio et al., History, Society, and Institutions: The Role
of Collective Memory in the Emergence and Evolution of Societal Logics, 41
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 676 (2016).
281
The CCP had, for example, offered a more compelling interpretation
of China’s unequal treaties. DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES:
NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 87–95 (2005). The Maoists’ institutional logics
are considered in further detail in Part III.B.4, infra.
282
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 169.
283
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 504–13.
284
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 170.
285
Williams, supra note 215, at 57–58.
286
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 171.
287
See, e.g., MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 150–51; SCHOPPA,
supra note 232, at 150–51.
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Communist leaders learned to be adaptable and regenerative
as the CCP struggled to survive in this era.288 The reformers who
would eventually design China’s legal system were embedded in an
environment that not only legitimized but necessitated
adaptability.289 The reformers’ versatility also foreshadowed their
success in positioning the CCP as China’s preeminent institutional
entrepreneur through legal flexibility.290
3.

People’s Republic of China under Mao (1949–1976)

As discussed above, China’s experience prior to the
establishment of the PRC was tumultuous, violent, and essentially
lawless, largely because of what foreign powers were doing—but
often also for mistakes among China’s own leaders.291 Upon the
CCP’s victory in 1949, China was—for the first time in a century—
free from coercive foreign influences. Unfortunately, the Maoist era
would prove even more destructive than the previous periods, as
Mao attempted first to remake China into the world’s premiere
socialist society, and then, having failed at this, to maintain control
of the CCP as pressure for equanimity mounted in the last decades
of his life.
Upon taking power, the CCP first confronted the task of
constructing a new state.292 This was Mao’s earliest priority: a
formal state would legitimize the CCP as China’s sole ruling body
288

The Party’s Long March is often cited as an example of these traits.
See, e.g., MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 252–64. Professor Gaddis states that:
“[S]urvivors tend to be those organisms that are required to adapt . . . to the
unexpected . . . There is, thus, a balance . . . [at] the edge of chaos . . . where
innovation, especially through self-organization, normally occurs. It is no great
stretch to suggest that something similar may work in the social, political, and
economic world[.]” GADDIS, supra note 103, at 87. This is descriptive of the
CCP’s experience in this era.
289
The CCP remains highly adaptive even today. RICHARD MCGREGOR,
THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 31 (2010).
290
See infra Part III.C.
291
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 165.
292
FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE TRAGEDY OF LIBERATION: A HISTORY OF THE
CHINESE REVOLUTION 1945–1957, at 39–152 (2013) [hereinafter THE TRAGEDY];
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 345–51.
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(a distinction also claimed by the KMT in Taiwan).293 Under this
early arrangement, the state’s authority was shared amongst the
Party, the military, and the nascent bureaucracy.294 The process of
state building included the basic functions of government295 but also
involved the rooting out of perceived enemies.296 Whereas the
Qing’s enemies had been mostly foreign, the CCP’s enemies were
internal.297 Class struggle encouraged citizens to act out against
capitalists, landlords, rich peasants, Nationalist sympathizers, and
counterrevolutionaries.298 Even the CCP was purged when it
appeared more burdensome than helpful to Mao’s ends, presaging
the Cultural Revolution a decade later.299
During the 1950s, the CCP enjoyed most of the successes it
would realize under Mao. China had, for instance, fought the U.S.
to a standstill in Korea, collectivized agriculture and industry,
implemented its first Five Year Plan of production,300 and carried
out campaigns to imbue citizens with political consciousness.301 Yet
Mao remained anxious to implement socialism. He prepared for this
during the Hundred Flowers Movement and Anti-Rightist
Campaign of 1956-1957, through which he attempted to eliminate
critics in society.302 Convinced of the success of these efforts, Mao
then launched his infamous Great Leap Forward.
The Great Leap ostensibly sought to surpass Great Britain’s
economic output by collectivizing property and mobilizing China’s

293

See THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 519–24. A state was also
necessary for China to reassert its sovereignty. Bedeski, supra note 54, at 546.
294
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 519.
295
THE TRAGEDY, supra note 292, at 46.
296
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 321.
297
Id. at 321–22.
298
WALDER, supra note 39, at 113.
299
THE TRAGEDY, supra note 292, at 158–59.
300
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 327; see also THE SEARCH, supra note
155, at 541–51 (discussing the Party’s first Five-Year Plan).
301
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 534–37.
302
Id. at 563–73. Citizens were encouraged to criticize the Party and
those who did later faced a crackdown in 1957 to discourage future opposition to
the socialist economic transformation.
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labor force to meet planned levels of production.303 Mao’s actual
ambition, however, was to claim the mantle of socialist leadership
by surpassing the USSR,304 and to repay the debts that China had
incurred by accepting Soviet industrial aid.305 The Great Leap was
catastrophic,306 with an estimated 30 million fatalities:307 famine
was the leading cause of death, while “coercion, terror and
systematic violence were [its] foundation[.]”308
Even for Mao, the results were difficult to ignore.309 He
retreated from public view in the early 1960s, and other Party
leaders “began to reverse some of the worst excesses”310 of the Great
Leap.311 China remained isolated internationally.312 As the Party
pursued reforms and with his power slipping, Mao launched the
Socialist Education Movement, the goal of which was to
“reintroduce basic socialist values into Chinese society.”313 Its
failure to expunge corruption and abuse from the Party set the stage
for Mao’s final move, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
After the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s
second attempt to create a model society that would lead the socialist

303

FRANK DIKÖTTER, MAO’S GREAT FAMINE: THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S
MOST DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE, 1958–1962, at ix (2010) [hereinafter MAO’S
GREAT FAMINE].
304
FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: A PEOPLE’S
HISTORY, 1962–1976, at 4 (2016) [hereinafter THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION].
305
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 575.
306
See THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 396–439 (discussing
the Great Leap and its aftermath).
307
Id. at 415.
308
MAO’S GREAT FAMINE, supra note 303, at x–xi; accord WESTAD,
supra note 274, at 339.
309
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 590.
310
WESTAD, supra note 274, at 339.
311
Mao “was happy to . . . let others begin to clear up the mess he had
created, though he kept close watch[.]” Id.
312
Id. at 333. Mao “had, almost [single-handedly], managed to wreck the
Sino-Soviet relationship.” Id. at 343. Mao resented the USSR’s visibility in the
global communist movement, disapproval of the Great Leap, and repudiation of
Stalinism. THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 403, 421–23.
313
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 591–96. The movement sought to
repair the Party’s legitimacy by “clean[ing] out . . . abuses in the CCP[.]” THE
PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 426–28.
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world by supplanting the Soviet Union.314 Mao’s complex motives
centered around keeping absolute power315 and preventing capitalist
revisionism.316
Tensions between Mao and the Party’s
establishment had been rising for years317 and, assured of the
military’s support,318 Mao declared war on revisionist enemies
within the CCP itself.319 Although Mao was viewed as the father of
the CCP,320 he urged citizens to attack Party authorities deemed to
be ‘counter-revolutionary.’ This reflected Mao’s conviction that
“only violent conflict could bring about genuine social change and
liberate the oppressed.”321 The duration of the Cultural Revolution,
from 1966 to 1976, was lawless and violent.322 Functional
government ceased to exist.323 Unsurprisingly, the Chinese
economy suffered. The Maoist economy blended markets and
centralization but resulted in a “crippled hybrid.”324 China was

314

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at xi.
Id. at 10–14; William A. Joseph, Foreword, in BORN RED: A
CHRONICLE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION xv–xvi (Yuan Gao ed., 1987);
RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION
3–12 (2006).
316
TANNER, supra note 226, at 519–22. By “capitalist revisionism,” Mao
meant the “abandonment of the goals of the revolution and acceptance . . . of
capitalism.” FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 384–86.
317
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 389–90.
318
Id. at 387.
319
TANNER, supra note 226, at 524.
320
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 385–86.
321
WALDER, supra note 39, at 336.
322
Benjamin Liebman & Tim Wu, China’s Network Justice, 8 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 257, 287 (2007). Mao’s fanatical supporters struggled against “counterrevolutionaries” and sent offenders to labor in the countryside. See, e.g., THE
CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304; FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note
133, at 393–95, 401–02; TANNER, supra note 226, at 535–36. Many accused of
counterrevolution were tortured or executed. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note
133, at 397–98. An estimated 400,000 to 500,000 people were killed in the
Cultural Revolution’s three bloodiest years. SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 355.
323
SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 351–55.
324
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 398.
315
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languishing in a state of dire traumatization at the time of Mao’s
death in 1976.325
Upon taking power, the CCP had abolished all semblances
of Nationalist law326 and began constructing a new legal system until
it was swept away in the Cultural Revolution.327 The CCP’s early
efforts at law were intended to transform Chinese culture as
envisioned by the Party’s elites,328 but officials were impatient for
change. Accordingly, any aspects of the emerging legal order
deemed too restrictive for China’s hasty revolution were
discarded.329 The CCP’s elites instead ruled directly by fiat.330 Mao
repeatedly disparaged the notion of bureaucracy and the stability
that it implied, as these were antithetical to continuous revolution
(and could also be stubbornly resistant to his will).331 It is thus
unsurprising that Maoist leaders “were never comfortable working
or thinking in a legal context.”332 Commensurate with the law’s
enfeebled state was Mao’s political use of ambiguity in his speeches:

325

Mao destroyed institutions but did so before substitutes could be
formulated. This scenario lent itself to corruption in the resulting institutional
vacuum. See Lan, supra note 8, at 398 n.159
326
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 186, at 56–59.
327
Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 1, 5–7 (Wang Chenguang and Zhang Xianchu
eds., 1997). Soviet law was heavily borrowed in these early years. Yu Xingzhong,
Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L.
29, 32 (1989).
328
TANNER, supra note 226, at 507–08 (discussing as one example the
Marriage Law of 1950).
329
CHOW, supra note 189, at 58 (noting that Maoists despised the law
because it discouraged their attacks on enemies); THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra
note 209, at 397 (discussing Liu Shaoqi’s view on this); POTTER, supra note 145,
at 5–8 (observing that law was criticized for obstructing Mao’s policy goals).
Eventually Mao found even this nascent law too restrictive and it was disregarded
altogether in the Cultural Revolution. BARRETT L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL
REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST
STATE 96 (1990).
330
MAO’S GREAT FAMINE, supra note 303, at 289–90; Michael, supra
note 159, at 135–36; Yu, supra note 327, at 36.
331
See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 387; accord Victor
H. Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 74 (1970).
332
Li, supra note 331, at 91.
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he concealed his strategies in deliberately vague rhetoric.333 The
reformers who succeeded Mao sought to institutionalize checks
against this sort of lawlessness.334 Nevertheless, the reformers had
no desire to constrain the CCP’s power, and their approach to legal
ambiguity ultimately resembled Mao’s tactics far more so than the
behaviors of high rule of law states.335
In any event, the CCP had acted as an institutional
entrepreneur—even under Mao.336 To this end, the CCP employed
campaigns and mass movements in which the government and often
the whole Chinese population were mobilized toward some common
goal.337 Once the Party determined that formal legality was
incompatible with its exercise of institutional entrepreneurship, it
turned instead to more chaotic, less formal tactics to attempt its
desired institutional changes. One of the reformers’ early priorities
was to remedy the Maoists’ excesses.338
4.

People’s Republic of China under Reform (1976–Present)

Mao’s death on September 9, 1976 was a critical juncture.
Three rival CCP factions competed to rule China in his wake:339 (1)

333

Mao practiced “ensnaring his enemies with the precision of a trapper.”
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at xii–xiii. Mao had long employed
ambiguity in his speech. See, e.g., THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 594 (noting a
typical example). Interestingly, firms also use vagueness in their corporate
communications when they perceive high threats of entry, thereby discouraging
imitation and new competitors. Wei Guo, Tieying Yu & Javier Gimeno, Language
and Competition: Communication Vagueness, Interpretation Difficulties, and
Market Entry, 60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 2073 (2017).
334
See infra Part III.C.
335
See Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing
Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China, in MAO’S
INVISIBLE HAND 1, 12–13 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011).
336
TANNER, supra note 226, at 503 (discussing Party efforts to transform
China).
337
Id.
338
See infra Parts III.B.4, III.C.
339
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Succession to Mao and the End of
Maoism, in 15 CAMBRIDGE HIST. OF CHINA 305 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John
K. Fairbank eds., 1991); accord HARRY HARDING, CHINA’S SECOND
REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO 40–69 (1987). Factionalism “is innate within
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the radicals (ultra-leftists, led by the Gang of Four, who had
overseen the Cultural Revolution and advocated continuous
revolution); (2) beneficiaries of the Revolution (who rose when their
seniors were purged, led by Mao’s designated successor Hua
Guofeng, whose “whatever faction” attempted to strike a middle
position between the radicals and reformers); and (3) the
Revolution’s survivors (the reformers who ultimately coalesced
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping).340 Deng had been
“rehabilitated”341 and then purged again in 1976, but survived Mao’s
last efforts to destroy him.342
The Gang of Four inherited what little of Mao’s legitimacy
proved transferable and sought absolute power rather than
collaboration with potential allies.343 The Gang underestimated
Hua,344 who had them arrested soon after Mao’s death.345 Many
Chinese celebrated the Gang’s downfall, yet the CCP recognized
that its legitimacy was tied to Mao’s.346 Thus, Hua’s rhetoric
denounced the Gang but not Mao directly. This decoupled citizens’
condemnation of Mao’s policies from Mao himself.347 The goal was
to acknowledge the CCP’s disastrous record without discrediting its
political authority.
However, Hua “lacked the institutional clout and political
charisma to shore up his power” and “[h]is reluctance to repudiate
the Cultural Revolution was out of tune with a widespread desire for
change.”348 In institutional terms, Hua adhered too closely to Maoist
logics at a time when the reformers were excelling as institutional
the CCP political system.” JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE COMMUNIST
POLITICS 21 (2000).
340
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 336–38, 357–58.
341
Id. at 347–58.
342
JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY 606–09
(2006).
343
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 358.
344
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 315.
345
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 367–70.
346
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 316.
347
Id.; see also MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 372–77.
348
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 317. Rhetorically,
Hua “had persisted with the slogans of the Cultural Revolution.” MacFarquhar,
supra note 339, at 387.
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entrepreneurs.349 Hua’s alignment with Maoist logics undermined
his already tenuous legitimacy.350 Moreover, Hua made little effort
at institutional entrepreneurship; he acted as a modest policy
innovator within Maoist logics, but not entrepreneurially with
respect to the logics themselves.351 As a product rather than a victim
of these logics, Hua was evidently unable or unwilling to disembed
himself from them. The reformers, recognizing that public
sentiment favored a paradigm shift, won the struggle for power
through their prowess as institutional entrepreneurs.352
In the ambiguity of the interregnum from 1976 to 1978,
during which the Hua and Deng factions’ logics clashed, Hua’s
incumbency was the more difficult position since a “somewhat
contradictory image of change combined with continuity had to be
conveyed.”353 This task could not be accomplished under Maoist
logics, since ‘change’ in the context of the reformers’ emergent
legitimization had come to mean abandoning Maoism. Hua and his
predecessors had neglected the historical lesson that the reformers
embraced as their governing thesis: though a political monopolist
may appear to hold absolute power at any given moment, it must
nevertheless work to legitimate and then to defend its logics,
requiring constant adaptation and the ability to shape society’s
adaptations; otherwise, credible competitors for power will
emerge.354
349

III.B.4.

See infra Part III.C. For more on the Maoists’ logics, see infra Part

350

See MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 377 (discussing Hua’s fidelity
to Maoist logics and resulting legitimacy problem).
351
See MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER: A HISTORY OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 428 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing Hua’s cautious attempt to
abandon the policies of the late Maoist period and return to those of early
Maoism).
352
HARDING, supra note 339, at 39; accord WALDER, supra note 39, at
343.
353
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 371.
354
This reflects the fact that the meanings, significance and desirability
of particular institutions are always intrinsically contestable, and that an
institution’s existence signals an invitation to stakeholders to contest the
institution for their own self-interests. As such, the threat of the institutions’
displacement—and with them, the incumbent’s—is always real. One means to
combat this threat is through institutional design: flexibility enables elites to
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Moreover, as the incumbent, Hua was blamed for the
conditions underlying society’s discontent. This burden of
incumbency was well-understood by the reformers but not by Hua.
His status quo response was similar to the Qing government’s
resistance to change, which had made China susceptible to foreign
powers while rendering the Qing’s legitimacy vulnerable to the
institutional entrepreneurs represented by the Nationalists.355 Yuan
Shikai’s brief regime then collapsed reverting to discredited
imperialist logics.356 Subsequently, the Nationalists witnessed their
legitimacy crumble as they took the blame for the problems of their
era, vitiating them against the institutional entrepreneurial efforts of
the CCP.357 And the consequences of the Maoists’ policies had left
their logics susceptible to displacement once Mao himself was
gone.358 Hua now found himself vulnerable—on account of his
incumbency, frail legitimacy, and imploding logics—to the
institutional entrepreneurs led by Deng. As the reformers’ logics
gained traction,359 Hua “would discover that position conferred
prestige and privilege, but power had deeper roots.”360
The Qing, Yuan Shikai, the Nationalists, the Maoists and
Hua Guofeng—each had failed when the burdens of incumbency
eroded their legitimacy, leaving them vulnerable to actors more
agile in institutional entrepreneurship.361 It is in this historical
context that the CCP’s reform leaders designed the country’s new
legal order. Scholars attribute to the reformers a strong desire to
avoid another Cultural Revolution.362 But the reformers desired
more—they sought an institutional reality that would stabilize their
‘referee’ institutional contests with a minimal corresponding ‘cost’ to the elites’
legitimacy. See infra Part III.C.
355
See supra Part III.B.1.
356
See supra Part III.B.2.
357
See supra Part III.B.2.
358
See supra Part III.B.3.
359
See MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 378 (noting that Deng mobilized
elite opinion through the press, and this was likely crucial to his victory over Hua).
360
Id. at 371.
361
See infra Figure 3. This is not to discount the role of the military, but
rather highlights the vital support that institutional entrepreneurship contributed
to the CCP’s military successes.
362
See infra notes 420–25 and accompanying text.
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incumbency without restraining it—to imbue the CCP permanently
not only with the prerogative but with the imperative of
entrepreneurial adaptability. The reformers sought to avoid
becoming vulnerable to more adept institutional entrepreneurs, as
their predecessors had been. A system of flexible formal legality
would be their principal tool of choice.
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In sum, the highly uncertain environment following Mao’s
death led to a power struggle the outcome of which belonged to the
faction championing the more compelling set of institutional
logics.363 In this particular confluence of history and emergence,
power was grounded in one’s agility as an institutional
entrepreneur—a role at which the reformers excelled.364 Mao had
attempted institutional entrepreneurship, even in the Cultural
Revolution, the goal of which was “to change the nature of the
Chinese people.”365 Ironically, Mao’s opportunism ensured the
Party’s adaptability through experimentation, even after the Party
had repudiated Maoism generally.366 The reformers would retain
Mao’s institutionalization of experimentation as a core Party
logic,367 but the overall results of Mao’s efforts were far more
destructive than creative, and left the CCP’s legitimacy in
shambles.368 The competing logics of the Maoists and the Deng
reformers are summarized in Figure 4.369

363

See Battilana et al., supra note 71, at 82 (noting that institutional
entrepreneurs advance new institutional logics or modify, defend, or destroy old
ones).
364
The reformers wielded their ideas as weapons. See Leonard
Seabrooke, Transnational Institutions and International Regimes, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 253, 263 (2010)
(discussing the use of ideas as weapons); MARK BLYTH, GREAT
TRANSFORMATIONS 45 (2002) (characterizing ideas as “profoundly important
political resources”).
365
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 305.
366
ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S
LONG MARCH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 392 (2013).
367
Experimentation enabled by flexibility remains central to PRC law.
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and
Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1111 (2011).
368
See infra Part III.C.
369
See supra Part I (defining institutional logics).
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The reformers emerged victorious at the Third Plenum of the
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.370 Like Hua, Deng
realized that the Party’s legitimacy (and his own) depended upon
repudiating the Cultural Revolution without delegitimizing Mao,371
leading to the trial and conviction of the Gang of Four.372
In 1981, the CCP issued a formal revisionist statement of its
own history.373 The resolution declared Mao mostly a success (but
also acknowledged his failures) and positioned Deng as the
paramount leader.374 With their version of history secured, the
reformers then turned to reshape China in a pragmatic vein375 by
institutionalizing their logics.376 The reformers enacted their
changes aware that China’s own path dependence had enabled
Mao’s excesses.377 Like most institutional entrepreneurs, the
reformers were determined to change the status quo from which they
had emerged. The reformers’ legal system would confer some
measure of permanence upon their logics378 at a time when the

370

MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 377–82.
Id. at 389–90.
372
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 318–19.
373
Id. at 319; see also MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 389–93. The
Party has produced numerous official histories. PHILIP P. PAN, OUT OF MAO’S
SHADOW 85–86 (2008).
374
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 320. History is a
crucial strategic resource in Chinese culture, see LIU, supra note 93, at 135–40,
so it is unsurprising that the reformers would seek to ensconce their version of
events. “The Chinese people take history much more seriously than their Western
counterparts,” LIU, supra note 93, at 136, and thus, history is a source of
legitimacy in China. Accord Diana Lary, The Uses of the Past, in THE CHINESE
PARTY-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 130, 131 (André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne
eds., 2008).
375
For example, Deng’s cooperation with the U.S. reflected his
pragmatism. See WESTAD, supra note 274, at 373.
376
This requires the proponent of the institutions to establish and
maintain their meanings, which are always contestable. John L. Campbell,
Institutional Reproduction and Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP.
INST. ANALYSIS 87, 105 (2010).
377
In particular, the Party’s 1981 resolution asserted that “Chinese feudal
autocracy” had allowed Mao to undermine the authority of law. MacFarquhar,
supra note 339, at 392.
378
See infra Part III.C.
371
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PRC’s legal system was in need of dramatic reform.379 The legal
reforms were intended to institutionalize an equilibrium between
stability and adaptability, erring on the side of the flexibility needed
to ensure the CCP’s authoritarian prerogative.380 By promulgating
flexible law, the reformers sought to use path dependence to their
advantage:381 future CCP leaders would be forced to attentively
oversee the interface between Party and society, thereby
necessitating the CCP’s ongoing role not merely as an institutional
entrepreneur, but as the PRC’s paramount institutional
entrepreneur.382
The CCP and state were thus rebuilt.383 The reformers began
constructing China’s contemporary legal system in the 1980s, in
large measure to provide the stability needed for foreign
investment.384 Although the reformers borrowed substantially from
Western legal systems, they did not desire Western law
institutionally.385 Thus, while post-Mao reforms signaled “an
understanding that the unbridled power of the Party ultimately
threatened everyone,”386 the state nevertheless remained immensely
powerful.387 Senior CCP leaders continue to “stand constant guard
against [any] encroachment on the Party’s power” that a Western
379

TANNER, supra note 226, at 551.
See infra Part III.C. Stability refers to the public’s assent (even if
passive) to the Party’s ongoing rule. See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Law and
Stability Paradox, in CHINA’S CHALLENGES 157, 161–62 (Jacques deLisle &
Avery Goldstein eds., 2015).
381
See PIERSON, supra note 96, at 10–11 (discussing path dependence).
382
See Hal Blanchard, Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: “Seeking
Truth from Facts,” 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 373–74 (2005) (noting some of the
Party’s advantages in legal flexibility).
383
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 393–401; DALI L. YANG, REMAKING
THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN 65 (2004) (noting that the reformers’ downsizing of
government was intended to make it more effective, and the Party more secure).
384
SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 370–71.
385
See William Partlett & Eric C. Ip, Is Socialist Law Really Dead?, 48
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 463, 510–11 (2016) (warning that China’s increasing
legal formality does not portend an institutional convergence with Western legal
systems).
386
MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 400.
387
Id. The PRC state remained powerful for an additional reason: even
private relationships such as contract depend upon state power. Lan, supra note
8, at 383.
380
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rule of law system would represent.388 This view has endured, most
tragically reflected at Tiananmen Square, where the Party sent “a
signal that still pulsates to this day: do not query the monopoly of
the one-party state.”389 To the extent that the PRC’s legal
institutions might imply self-restraint by the Party, it holds only so
long as the Party believes that it can zealously protect its power. The
legal system is not viewed as an avenue to a democratic state, but as
a means to legitimize and enhance the stability of the CCP as the
source of all political power.390 While the formalism of this
arrangement may represent a stronger rule of law than at any other
time in China’s history, law is primarily used to defuse tensions,391
maintain order, and sustain the CCP’s monopoly.
There are two important implications of the evolution of the
PRC’s legal system as discussed above. First, the reformers came
to power with the realization that if they and the CCP were to
survive, institutional entrepreneurship would be a vital feature of
their governance.392 China’s prior rulers had either waited until
conditions were bad to attempt institutional entrepreneurship
(treating it as a discrete tool to be applied only selectively), or hardly
attempted it at all.393 The reformers saw the need for institutional
entrepreneurship as a tool to be applied continuously rather than
intermittently. China’s system of flexible legality reflects this
388

One senior leader asserted in 2007 that the PRC’s enemies “were
trying to use the law to undermine and divide China.” MCGREGOR, supra note
289, at 25; accord Liebman, China’s Law and Stability Paradox, supra note 380,
at 173. “The correct political stand,” this member reiterated, “is where the Party
stands.” MCGREGOR, supra note 289, at 25.
389
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 322; see also
Lubman, supra note 37, at 77 (discussing the CCP’s unwillingness to place itself
within the reach of the law).
390
Legal and political reforms “were not meant as stepping-stones
toward . . . multiparty democracy: the goal of reform was to preserve and enhance
the stability of the single-party state.” TANNER, supra note 226, at 553; see also
supra text accompanying note 37.
391
TANNER, supra note 226, at 568.
392
Indeed, the Party’s “continued . . . rule derives from [its] successful
adaptation to changing economic and social conditions.” TERESA WRIGHT,
ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN CHINA’S
REFORM ERA 26 (2010) [hereinafter ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM].
393
See supra Figure 3.
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realization. Second, history provides practical insights for MNCs
doing business in China today. While the PRC’s legal system
emerged out of the CCP’s self-interested effort to conserve its
legitimacy and role as institutional entrepreneur, that very system
now affords MNCs with the opportunity, if not the imperative, to
engage in legal entrepreneurship. The flexibility of the PRC’s legal
system supplies a conducive context for doing so.394
The next section concludes the analysis of why the PRC’s
legal system is so flexible by examining the nearly insurmountable
tensions that the reformers had to accommodate through
institutional design.
C. History, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Law: CCP as
Institutional Entrepreneur
By the early 1980’s, the CCP’s Fundamental Dilemma was
apparent: how to establish the requisite stability for economic
growth, thereby making China strong internationally, without
sacrificing the Party’s legitimacy or strength domestically.
Whatever the solution, it would have to account for potential
challengers to the CCP’s monopoly, spectacular pressures on the
CCP’s legitimacy, and the trade-off between the economic need for
predictability and the CCP’s need for discretion.395 The reformers
were thus faced with a seemingly intractable dilemma with no
obvious solutions. Yet the Party has devised a solution—through
legal flexibility—and this solution is working,396 at least for now.
For most American observers, “[t]he primary Chinese
motivation for undertaking legal reform . . . is economic,” but it is
clear to both U.S. government officials and non-governmental
experts that China’s “leadership wants to prevent reforms from
seeping into the political sphere, and does not want any reforms that
would undermine the central leadership’s decision-making
394

See infra Part V.
See RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA’S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 21
(1994) (discussing the necessity of predictability and unity within the law).
396
The CCP “survives because both the elites and the people perceive it
as successful.” Ivan Krastev, Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism, 22 J.
DEMOCRACY 5, 8 (2011).
395
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authority.”397 Flexible law facilitates economic reform without the
need for substantial political reforms, and the analysis above
suggests that while economic liberalization was clearly one of the
reformers’ major goals, their top priority was the preservation of the
CCP’s power.398 Economic reforms were pursued because a rising
standard of living was the factor most likely to repair the CCP’s
legitimacy after Mao.399 Hence, the typical assumption—that
China’s legal reforms were intended simply to spur economic
growth—greatly oversimplifies the CCP’s actual motives. The
implementation of economic and legal reforms does not explain the
flexibility of the PRC’s legal system when certainty and
predictability (that is, the objective and transparent application of
formal rules) are considered the accepted model for stable economic
growth.400 Had the top priority been simply to grow the economy,
the Party would have attempted a legal system affording maximum
predictability and the minimization of transaction costs.401 The
analysis above reveals a more complex set of motives in which the
CCP intended not merely to reform the PRC economy, but to do so

397

Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?
Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of Law’ Reform Projects in the
People’s Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 77 (2000).
398
Economic expansion alone hardly guarantees the Party’s success.
Zhengxu Wang, Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes, in LEGITIMACY:
AMBIGUITIES OF POLITICAL SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
113, 138 (Lynn White ed., 2005).
399
Mao’s ideological and charismatic authority enabled him to
circumvent the historical lesson that his successors could not: a ruler’s legitimacy
is generally tied to its delivery of public goods and promotion of the public
welfare. VON GLAHN, supra note 232, at 85, 398–99.
400
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY:
FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY
371 (2014) (noting that most China observers have focused on economic reforms
while neglecting political institutions).
401
Clearly, the CCP has not opted for a legal system of maximum
predictability. See, e.g., Katherine R. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections
as Substitutes for Formal Institutional Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1643
(1996) (noting that China’s “institutional instability . . . make[s] market exchanges
uncertain and costly”); see also supra Part III.A.
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on its own terms.402 “Dictators are inherently insecure,”403 and
flexible law can help to promote the dictator’s stability while still
allowing for the private economic activity that finances the
dictator’s government.404
Western expectations that other
stakeholders’ interests will independently drive legal reform in
China are misplaced.405
Legitimacy lends itself to abstractions, but its actual
manifestation is vitally important to political actors. Professor
Lipset states “most sociologists would agree that stable authority is
power plus legitimacy.”406 As discussed previously, the CCP’s
purity of ideology had sustained its legitimacy for most of Mao’s
rule, but its destructive record eventually eroded its credibility.407
By the end of Mao’s reign, it appeared as though the CCP was
careening toward the same fate as its predecessors.408 To prevent
the Party’s own self-destruction, the reformers created institutions
that could accommodate an array of conflicting demands,409
institutionalizing the flexibility essential to the CCP’s ongoing
402

Hence, China’s legal formalization does not yield “increasing
autonomy from the dictates of party policy.” Biddulph, supra note 157, at 224.
403
Stephen Haber, Authoritarian Government, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POL. ECONOMY 693, 694 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A.
Wittman eds., 2006).
404
See id. at 698–99 (noting that a lack of property rights undercuts an
authoritarian by depriving it of a reliable tax base).
405
China’s legal institutions are accomplishing exactly what they were
designed to do. Dillon, supra note 158, at 186; Benjamin L. Liebman, Essay,
Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
181, 244–45 (2013).
406
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF
POLITICS 22 (1963) (emphasis added).
407
See supra Part III.B. Still, ideology does impact the Party’s
legitimacy. See Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy
in China: A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339
(2009).
408
See supra Figure 3 (summarizing China’s modern rulers and their
respective fates).
409
China’s formal law has accommodated myriad informal institutions.
Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,
42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006); Mary Szto, Strengthening the Rule of Virtue and
Finding Chinese Law in “Other” Places: Gods, Kin, Guilds, and Gifts, 35
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2012).
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entrepreneurship without ossifying the institutions themselves. The
CCP’s mechanism for accomplishing these ambitious goals would
be its flexible legal regime—an immensely adaptive system
distinctively resistant to institutionalization, designed to ensure the
CCP’s primacy amongst China’s institutional entrepreneurs even
while tolerating power outside of the Party.
The reformers’ rationale for formal law was straightforward.
Deng and the reformers harbored a deep psychological need to
restore the PRC’s strength internationally—an imperative long
shared by the Chinese public.410 So long as the PRC’s sovereignty
was tenuous,411 the CCP’s legitimacy would remain vulnerable to
attack.412 The reformers also understood that affluence was key to
restoring the PRC’s strength413—only a freer market could finance
a government strong enough to enforce China’s territorial and
economic integrity.414 In turn, however, the PRC’s development
410

R. Lufrano, Yan Jiaqi: “How China Can Become Prosperous”, in 2
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 523, 524 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt
eds., 1992) (noting that “the question of how China is to achieve wealth and power
goes back to the self-strengthening movement of the 1860s . . .”); see also supra
Part III.B; DREYER, supra note 36, at 6; Heilmann & Schulte-Kulkman, supra
note 178, at 641; Kaufman, supra note 218, at 2; Peerenboom, supra note 218, at
654–55.
411
While China was under no immediate threat at this time, many elites
then, like today, perceived that the PRC’s autonomy and very existence were
threatened by a “world order dominated by ‘hegemonic’ Western powers . . . .”
EDWARD VICKERS & ZENG XIADONG, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN POST-MAO
CHINA 324 (2017).
412
The Communists themselves had gained traction in the civil war by
convincing the public that the Nationalists were responsible for China’s baleful
state. See e.g., DREYER, supra note 36, at 82–84; CHIANG KAI SHEK, supra note
276, at 348–49, 484–86 (2003); ROBERTS, supra note 263, at 412.
413
Peerenboom, supra note 218, at 654–56 (observing that the reformers’
focus has been “economic development and political stability”). “Political
stability” here refers to the preservation of the CCP’s political monopoly. See
supra text accompanying note 37.
414
The goals of development and order are central to all states. Nasra &
Dacin, supra note 96, at 586–87. Rulers must have an effective tax system to fund
their military and other public goods. Donald F. Kettl, Public Bureaucracies, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 366, 367 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al.
eds., 2006). Western powers had dramatically weakened the Chinese
government’s financial base during the Century of Humiliation, see VON GLAHN,
supra note 232, at 397, so the voluntary re-introduction of foreign economic
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would depend, at least initially, upon foreign investment—and a
reasonably stable legal system was a prerequisite to attracting such
investment.415 Before the PRC’s standing could be strengthened
internationally,416 a private marketplace and salutary legal system
were needed domestically.417 The twin goals of political stability
and economic growth required the exercise of institutional
entrepreneurship to provide the proper context for their
achievement.418 Thus, institutional entrepreneurship in legal reform
became central to the CCP’s survival.419 The goals of stability and
growth, informed by the need for foreign capital, favored a stable
and predictable legal order.
actors was a sensitive issue for the reformers. The Qing had even recognized
“commercial warfare” as key to reclaiming China’s sovereignty, VON GLAHN,
supra note 232, at 378, and viewed the economy strategically, Jane Kate Leonard,
The State’s Resources and the People’s Livelihood (Guoji Minsheng): The
Daoguang Emperor’s Dilemmas about Grand Canal Restoration, 1825, in TO
ACHIEVE SECURITY AND WEALTH 47, 50–51 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt
eds., 1992).
415
Li, supra note 172, at 73; see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in
Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 717 (1994). Clearly, China’s law has been
stable enough to attract foreign investment in the reform era. Some scholars
attribute foreign capital to saving the Party’s monopoly. See, e.g., Mary E.
Gallagher, “Reform and Openness,” 54 WORLD POL. 338, 372 (2002).
416
Flora Sapio, The Invisible Hand of Government: The Conceptual
Origins of Social Management Innovation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW AND
STABILITY IN CHINA 244–45 (Susan Trevaskes et al. eds., 2014).
417
An authoritarian “government’s imperative is sustaining state power.
Economics and markets are tools to do so.” JOHN D. DANIELS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 98 (14th ed. 2013).
418
See Zhu, supra note 145, at 429; Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and
Institutional Change: The Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 260 (2008)
(linking institutions and legitimacy). Mao had “failed to deliver on the longstanding promise of all Chinese revolutionaries since the early twentieth
century—building a prosperous China strong enough to protect its national
interests in a dangerous world.” Jacques deLisle & Avery Goldstein, China’s
Challenges: Reform Era Legacies and the Road Ahead, in CHINA’S CHALLENGES
1, 3–4 (Jacques deLisle & Avery Goldstein eds., 2105). Today’s Party claims
credit for ending the Century of Humiliation as part of its legitimacy. WANG,
supra note 218, at 127–29.
419
Many scholars argue that China’s capitalism has reinforced rather
than eroded its political system. See, e.g., ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM, supra
note 392, at 22–23.
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The PRC’s internal traumas supplied the reformers with at
least three additional reasons to favor a stable, formal legal system.
First, so ineffectual was the PRC’s initial law that Mao had
encountered virtually no institutional resistance to a war against his
rivals within the CCP.420 Legal order might discourage political
instability.421 Moreover, the Party’s survival would require the
peaceful resolution of intra-Party strife, particularly as new factions
were invited into the fold.422 Factional monopolies require
particularly strong institutions.423 The reformers recognized this
reality:424 the right legal system would promote the CCP’s durability
from within.425
Second, the reformers understood the market imperative for
law. Economic development was needed to finance the PRC’s
strength. Therefore, a new legal system was needed to maintain
order and foster economic incentives,426 and would also, conversely,
420

TANNER, supra note 226, at 550–51 (“Many senior Party officials and
their families had endured terrible personal suffering during the Cultural
Revolution.”).
421
Keller, supra note 415, at 713; accord YANG FENGCHUN, CHINESE
GOVERNMENT 61 (2004).
422
Factions pervade the Party. See Ben Hillman, Factions and Spoils:
Examining Political Behavior within the Local State in China, 64 CHINA J. 1, 3
n.9 (2010) (listing major scholarly works addressing CCP factionalism); see
generally Victor Shih et al., Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining
the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 166 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that factional ties drive promotions in the
PRC bureaucracy).
423
See DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 155
(2009) (noting the value for political incumbents of laws that can be enforced
across sundry power dynamics).
424
See MILAN W. SVOLIK, THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 92–
117 (2012) (arguing that authoritarians can benefit from institutionalizing the
rules of power-sharing among elites and showing that China’s reformers did this
to prevent another Maoist personality cult). “[B]y being less likely destabilizing
from within, regimes that institutionalize power-sharing may be even more
successful at confronting mass challenges.” Id. at 117.
425
See RONALD COASE & NING WANG, HOW CHINA BECAME
CAPITALIST 101–02 (2012) (noting that the reformers’ legal system was intended
to prevent another personality cult).
426
Wang, supra note 327, at 12 (observing that the reformers viewed the
law as a necessary means to maintain economic development); CHEN, supra note
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facilitate social order through economic growth.427 The CCP would
not adopt Western models wholesale, but would instead develop
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”428—that is, growth
commensurate with the CCP’s continuing rule.429
Third, as noted above, the CCP was facing a legitimacy crisis
when Deng took power, and the reformers were acutely aware of
this.430 Mao’s reign yielded extreme hardship for most citizens.431
As pragmatists, the reformers realized that “[l]egitimacy is at the
basis of power”432—that“[e]ven communist and authoritarian single

152, at 97 (noting that reforms are “aimed at creating a stable social order for
smooth economic development”); DREYER, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that Deng
supported the introduction of “the rule of law” but that “[h]is rationale . . . was
less civil libertarian than a result of his belief that a legal system was necessary to
resolve disputes . . . before the wheels of production could turn smoothly”).
427
Susan Trevaskes et al., Framing the Stability Imperative, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA 268, 272–73 (Susan Trevaskes et al.
eds., 2014); YUEH, supra note 6, at 9–13.
428
DREYER, supra note 36, at 5–6 (noting that while no definitive
definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been established, it
includes the ability to increase one’s wealth, which in turn requires some degree
of individual freedom and incentive).
429
See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting the assumption that the
CCP’s top priority is its own survival as a political monopoly).
430
FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 1; accord THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION,
supra note 304, at 321; MACFARQUHAR & SCHOENHALS, supra note 315, at 1–3;
see also YICHING WU, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: CHINESE
SOCIALISM IN CRISIS 219 (2014) (arguing that China’s legal system represents
both a developmental strategy and a “response . . . to continuously developing
crises”).
431
See, e.g., Victims, in CHINESE CIVILIZATION: A SOURCEBOOK 458–69
(Patricia Buckley Ebrey ed., 1993) (recounting one family’s experiences); see
also HUANG, supra note 23, at 23–24. “The evident political bankruptcy of the
[Maoist] leadership . . . allowed a resurgence of [the reform factions, who
prioritized] economic development over social transformation.” Charles Burton,
China’s Post-Mao Transition: The Role of the Party and Ideology in the “New
Period,” 60 PAC. AFF. 431, 431 (1987). The Maoists had failed to meet society’s
expectations. Id. at 435. Reform policies would “in large part [be] a response to
the ‘crisis of faith’ in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought which
became a widespread phenomenon.” Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 155, at 423–
24.
432
Li, supra note 1, at 49; accord Gilley, supra note 418, at 269.
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party-states require popular legitimacy to sustain their rule.”433 Mao
“left China in a quiet crisis”—in such a bad state that he unwittingly
“gave his successors the opportunity for a new start.”434 The
reformers saw the implementation of a flexible legal system as a sort
of pressure release valve,435 allowing the Party to address demands
for justice, without committing to a uniform response that would
constrain the CCP’s future options.436
Among other benefits, such as legitimizing power, formal
law enabled the CCP to be more responsive to the public.437 Hence,
the reformers began consciously using formal law as a means to
promote the CCP’s legitimacy.438 The reformers set out to establish
a new political culture—stable yet flexible, accommodating of
private interests but with the CCP firmly ensconced.439 Under Mao,
officials attempted to discredit every other conceivable source of
authority (including China’s history and traditions) in an effort to
433

DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND
ADAPTATION 2–3 (2008); accord ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 45 (2001).
434
WALDER, supra note 39, at 341–42 (noting that the early reformers
enjoyed an opportunity “outside the narrow limits of Maoist doctrine”).
435
See Gallagher, supra note 415, at 372 (arguing that the CCP promotes
law both to assert control over society and to stave off demands for
democratization); Slater, supra note 165, at 140–41 (noting that the collapse of
authoritarian states is usually punctuated since their institutions tend to be
unresponsive to public pressures).
436
See, e.g., Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of
Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 75 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 75 (2006)
(showing how flexibility enables local PRC courts to maintain their legitimacy
despite conflicting global institutional pressures).
437
PARTY AND STATE, supra note 43, at 180; COASE & WANG, supra
note 425, at 102 (arguing that formal legality protects the Party from reckless
leaders and mass participation).
438
Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary
China, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 51, 79–80 (2002); see generally Pitman B. Potter,
Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China, 138 CHINA
Q. 325 (1994).
439
This was crucial to the reformers because “[p]olitical legitimacy is
conceptualized and contested through the medium of political culture.” MLADA
BUKOVANSKY, LEGITIMACY AND POWER POLITICS: THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH
REVOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE 2 (2002); see also
WENFANG TANG, POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM: CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE
AND REGIME SUSTAINABILITY 2–5 (2016).
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command citizens’ total loyalty.440 The reformers’ political culture
became more complex.441 Establishing a new political culture is
challenging.442 By the time the reformers took power, “[t]he
instability of the legal framework cultivated a social cynicism
toward law and order in China[.]”443 Still, some semblance of
continuity was fabricated to facilitate reform.444 As a result, the
CCP continued to wield total control based upon the fusion of
cultural, economic and political power that enables today’s officials
to defend their legitimacy within the broader institutional
framework.
440

See, e.g., Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 271 n.170 (1999) (noting that during the
Cultural Revolution, Mao “led a violent political assault on China’s cultural
traditions …”); Bruce J. Dickson, The Survival Strategy of the Chinese
Communist Party, 39 WASH. Q. 27, 37 (2016) (observing that “[w]hen the CCP
first came to power in 1949, it was committed to eradicating Confucian
traditions”); Erin E. Douglas, The Chinese Communist Party and Western Values
Clash, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 162 (2001) (noting, in an example
typical of the era, that Mao tested the loyalty of intellectuals during the Hundred
Flowers Campaign); Orville Schell, China’s Cover-Up, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2018, at 22 (noting, inter alia, the CCP’s efforts to “‘rectify’ young people’s
thinking” under Mao and its subsequent efforts to control the official historical
record surrounding its existence); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with
Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter
Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 56–57 (2010) (stating, inter alia, that
“[i]n Mao’s era, the obligation-based theme [that is, the Confucian expectation of
loyalty] had become a political force”).
441
FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 2.
442
Id. Some Maoist logics were well-entrenched and resistant to change,
even though many citizens welcomed political moderation and reform. See, e.g.,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, What is Wrong with Being Red and
Expert?, in CHINA SINCE 1919: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 214–15 (2004)
(excerpting an article in which reformers countered the “Red but not expert”
Maoist logic of the Cultural Revolution); see also MICHAEL DUTTON, POLICING
CHINESE POLITICS: A HISTORY 263–64 (2005) (discussing the importance of
formal law in the reformers’ creation of a new political culture).
443
DING LU, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SUPPRESSED MARKETS: PRIVATESECTOR EXPERIENCE IN CHINA 158 (1994).
444
TANG, supra note 439, at 11–12; see also WU, supra note 430, at 220
(“[B]y preempting popular challenges . . . [market reforms] posed less of a threat
to the position of the ruling elite. All these measures were, after all, conducted
within the calculated political limits of maintaining the existing structure of
power.”).
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Threats to an authoritarian regime can arise from other elites,
the public, and from foreign powers; and the incumbent’s response
will depend upon the nature of the threat.445 The reformers
inaugurated the creation of a private marketplace and the
establishment of a Chinese rule of law in tandem.446 Today, the
CCP’s survival strategy entails carrots in the form of economic
opportunity and appeals to symbolic authorities (such as
nationalism, the selective invocation of China’s traditional heritage,
and co-optation), as well as sticks (the repression of perceived
threats).447 The legal system implemented by the CCP was intended
to serve (and in fact has served) the CCP’s strategy of buttressing a
socialist rule of law, promoting the economy, and repairing the
elites’ legitimacy.448
This discussion illustrates why the reformers favored a
formal legal system: to prevent another Maoist personality cult;
provide a foundation for the economic growth that would finance
the PRC’s restoration of its global status; and repair the CCP’s
legitimacy by conditioning the rising affluence of everyday citizens
upon its continuing rule. Yet these factors do not explain the PRC’s
high degree of legal flexibility, which is generally viewed as
antithetical to such goals as stability and commerce. More is needed
to show why the CCP came to favor such a flexible formal legal
system: we must also consider the most daunting challenges
accompanying legal reform within the historical context established
in Part III.B.449
445

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL
SURVIVAL 23 (2003).
446
THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 704. The reformers “saw legal reform
. . . as a useful instrument not to promote democratic governance but to improve
the means of Party control over society.” CHEN, supra note 152, at 169. Rapid
economic change facilitates and mutually supports institutional adaptability.
Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of
Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
551, 587–97 (2009).
447
See, e.g., THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 145, at 2–3.
448
See CHEN, supra note 152, at 156–58.
449
China’s legal flexibilities enable controlled experiments to test ideas
before implementing them widely. The reformers adopted a strategy—“take one
step and then decide on the next step”—which “allows the CCP a high degree of
political responsiveness” by “constantly . . . readapt[ing] its governance . . . to
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The reforms first prompted yet another legitimacy crisis, the
irony of which was palpable. Radical socialism had failed450 and the
CCP turned to capitalist reforms. But as policies jettisoned pure
socialism in favor of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” little
remained to distinguish the CCP from alternative political groups.451
“If China’s ‘socialist cause’ were endangered, so too would be the
legitimacy of the CCP’s national rule.”452 The shift from socialism
to quasi-capitalism suffered from a “complete lack of reliance on
any theoretical rationalization for the change.”453 Moreover,
corruption pervaded the Communist bureaucracy in the 1980s.454 In
denying these problems, the CCP’s continued use of socialist
rhetoric confused the average citizen, who observed a largely free
marketplace in daily life.455 The resulting dichotomy between
rhetoric and reality further eroded the CCP’s credibility.456 Certain
human factors associated with the transition, including
incompetence, also undercut the CCP’s standing.457 And early in
reform, most bureaucrats were still Maoists critical of the reformers’
agenda.458 Balance, pragmatism, and flexibility were essential to
meet . . . emerging demands.” Burton, supra note 431, at 445–46. This strategy is
commensurate with the reformers’ realization of the need for a continuous
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship. This incremental strategy
“implicitly acknowledges no ideological ‘truths’ or preconceived political ends at
all.” Id. at 445.
450
See supra Part III.B.3.
451
Burton, supra note 431, at 437. Mao had foreseen this dilemma. Id.
In moving away from its ideological legitimacy, the Party instead embraced the
“principles of nationalism, Chinese industry, and the ability of China to compete
in the international economy.” Gallagher, supra note 415, at 371.
452
Burton, supra note 431, at 437; accord WANG HUI, CHINA’S NEW
ORDER 57–58 (2003).
453
Burton, supra note 431, at 437; accord Lubman, supra note 37, at 80–
81; MEISNER, supra note 351, at 437.
454
MEISNER, supra note 351, at 476.
455
HUI, supra note 452, at 57. The reformers could not repudiate Mao
altogether, and indeed, had to characterize Mao’s legacy with caution for the sake
of the Party’s legitimacy. See HUANG, supra note 23, at 21; MEISNER, supra note
351, at 439–46.
456
SAICH, supra note 152, at 3.
457
JOHN BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA’S
ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL CULTURE 58 (2001).
458
See DREYER, supra note 36, at 112–20.

73

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

246

PACE INT’L L. REV.

2/27/19 8:08 PM

[Vol. 31:1

the reformers’ efforts as they struggled to reconcile formal law with
authoritarian rule.459
The second major challenge that a formal legal system posed
was the law’s restrictive nature—not for society, but for the CCP
itself.460 Irrespective of the particular policies it embodies, the law
constrains government action.461 This seems counterintuitive for an
authoritarian government; the CCP can change its policies at will.462
459

Balance has been institutionalized as part of China’s broader reforms.
See David Shambaugh, The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era, in THE MODERN
CHINESE STATE 181 (David Shambaugh ed., 2000); see also BRUCE GILLEY, THE
RIGHT TO RULE: HOW STATES WIN AND LOSE LEGITIMACY 25 (2009) (citing the
CCP’s 2004 acknowledgment that its ruling status is not ensured and must be
diligently managed). The Party also values flexibility because the goals of
economic development and social order are not always consistent with one
another. Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns as a Means of
Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-Urban Migrant Enclave in Beijing, 17
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 121, 138–39 (2003).
460
Indeed, any institutionalization is constraining. FEWSMITH, supra note
17, at 5. Even the “[i]nstitutionalization of state-society relations . . . binds the
party-state . . . .” Id. at 12.
461
The law and economics movement “perceives law as restraining the
state and empowering private actors.” RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 452–53 (2002). Ancient Chinese rulers
recognized that public laws constrained their freedom to act. Qiang Fang & Roger
Des Forges, Were Chinese Rulers Above the Law? Toward a Theory of the Rule
of Law in China from Early Times to 1949 CE, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2008).
The ancient Chinese correlated their leaders’ faithful observance of the laws with
the leaders’ legitimacy; thus, a ruler’s downfall was often attributed to their
disregard of the laws. Id.; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 361 (noting that
Chinese emperors were restrained by the bureaucracy and court rules); Huang
Zongxi, Critique of the Chinese Dynastic System, in 2 SOURCES OF CHINESE
TRADITION 4, 10–12 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 1992) (asserting
that, in ancient China, “as [the laws] become tighter they become the very source
of disorder”). Mao, too, was constrained—even by informal institutions—and this
explains his attacks on traditional Chinese culture. See COASE & WANG, supra
note 425, at 11. Local officials today also resent the constraints of law. STEPHEN
K. MA, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: EFFICIENCY OR ETHICS
123 (1996).
462
The institutionalization of policy-making processes curtails the elites’
‘freedom of action’ in a second way, in addition to the legitimacy constraint. See
HUANG, supra note 23, at 14–15. This helps to explain the Party’s use of
campaigns today—to mitigate bureaucratic entrenchment. See Elizabeth J. Perry,
From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: ‘Constructing a New Socialist
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But even in an authoritarian system, publicly available laws function
as a commitment by the state—a commitment that the government
will act in a certain way under certain circumstances, and a
commitment to use the state’s coercive power to compel compliance
by others.463 The CCP’s legitimacy is invariably placed at issue
when laws are disseminated openly.464 Public laws create public
expectations, which are then measured against the state’s actual
behavior.465 The CCP is thus conflicted, in some instances desiring
innovation and in others, resisting it.466
This Paper has argued that China’s flexible formal legality
is one of the CCP’s key institutional mechanisms to balance these
conflicting concerns.467 Like other authoritarians, the CCP must
oppose the Western perspective of the rule of law,468 as it is
incompatible with absolute state power.
More generally,
authoritarians must oppose any institutions that might constrain their
power, or else learn how to mitigate or manipulate such forces.
Institutionalization endows the law with a life of its own,469 and the
Countryside,’ in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 30, 51 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth
J. Perry eds., 2011).
463
See Corne, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing the tradeoff between
predictability for regulated actors and the Party’s flexibility to respond to social
developments); accord Mary E. Gallagher, “Use the Law as Your Weapon!”, in
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA 54, 76 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005); Glenn
Morgan & Sigrid Quack, Law as a Governing Institution, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 275, 276 (2010).
464
Politicians’ “freedom of action has usually been constrained by
concerns to preserve ‘legitimacy’ . . . .” Lawrence, supra note 123, at 224.
465
Gallagher, supra note 463, at 76; Liebman, supra note 145, at 20–21;
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, The China Aviation Oil Episode: Law and
Development in China and Singapore, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS 329, 347–48 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013).
466
FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 15–16.
467
For instance, the Party’s use of enforcement campaigns contains
elements of both flexibility and legal rationality and ultimately promotes the goal
of social control. See, e.g., Sarah Biddulph et al., Rule of Law with Chinese
Characteristics: The Role of Campaigns in Lawmaking, 34 LAW & POL’Y 373
(2012); He, supra note 459.
468
See FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 11–12.
469
Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 465, at 346 (“Once enacted . . . law
often takes on a life of its own as different agents begin to explore how it might
advance their own interests.”).
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reformers realized that in order to obtain some of the benefits of
formal law while also preventing it from becoming entrenched and
independent of the CCP, the law’s flexibility could act as the
mitigating factor.
The law’s constraining nature is also linked to the CCP’s
legitimacy challenge. Even the CCP requires sufficient legitimacy—
and the cooperation of the governed—to maintain its position.470
The Party voluntarily undercuts its own vitality when it ignores or
contravenes the commitments embodied in its laws.471 This is
precisely why the Maoists,472 and China’s imperial rulers,473
470

See JENNIFER GANDHI, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER
DICTATORSHIP xvii–xviii (2008) (noting that authoritarians require legitimacy and
the cooperation of the governed); accord Jean Blondel, About Institutions, Mainly,
But Not Exclusively, Political, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS
716, 727 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006); Hand, supra note 438, at 102; Philip
C.C. Huang, The Basis for the Legitimacy of the Chinese Political System:
Whence and Whither? Dialogues Among Western and Chinese Scholars, VII –
Editor’s Introduction, 40 MOD. CHINA 107, 107 (2014); WANG, supra note 130,
at 5–7; see also THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 145, at 214–215 (noting
that “the Party’s survival strategy has major impacts on [its] popular support”).
471
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping’s
China, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 469, 481 (1997) (noting that while “[c]larity was
sorely needed” in the 1982 Constitution from the societal perspective, “clarity was
too dangerous [to the Party’s interests] and might impair [the Party’s]
legitimacy”).
472
“Some [in Mao’s era] believed that while laws were clearer and more
precise after being written down, they also became more difficult to change.” Li,
supra note 331, at 89. Mao’s generation viewed rules as roadblocks to continuous
revolution. Id.; accord Donald C. Clarke, The Law, the State and Economic
Reform, in THE CHINESE STATE IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORM 190 (Gordon
White ed., 1991); Heilmann & Perry, supra note 335, at 14. Even Mao was
constrained by the Party’s inertia until the Cultural Revolution. See DAVID
BACHMAN, BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMY, AND LEADERSHIP IN CHINA 47, 237
(1991).
473
Ernest Caldwell, Social Change and Written Law in Early Chinese
Legal Thought, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2014) (noting concerns that written law
would constrain elites); Wolfram Eberheard, The Political Function of Astronomy
and Astronomers in Han China, in CHINESE THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS 15
(John K. Fairbank ed., 1957) (showing how informal institutions limited the
emperor’s power); Fang & Des Forges, supra note 461, at 106, 122 (noting that
ancient authorities debated the tradeoffs of making laws public); S.E. FINER, THE
HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES: ANCIENT MONARCHIES
AND EMPIRES 1303 (1997) (noting informal institutional constraints placed on the
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despised publicly-available rules. Mao foresaw what would occur
with a formal and transparent set of laws: confronted by changing
or unanticipated circumstances, the CCP would be forced to either
(a) act contrary to its own commitments, thereby destroying its
credibility in plain view of the public, or (b) act in accordance with
the law, voluntarily restraining its range of motion and degrading its
ability to control society.474
The constraining nature of formal law conflicted with the
reformers’ desire for change. Although the reformers fostered some
idea of the rule of law, a market economy, and individual economic
incentives, they nevertheless remained communists.475
The
reformers were as fervently committed as the Maoists had been to
the maintenance of the CCP’s monopoly.476 Absolute power and the
provision of market-based incentives have become binary in the
PRC context. Its power has enabled the CCP to create by fiat a
market economy without the constraints of Western institutions.
Instead of a Western rule of law, the CCP instituted a regime imbued
with legal flexibility. This allows the CCP’s evolving policies to be
more easily integrated into laws and regulations, facilitated by their
emperor); LUBMAN, supra note 238, at 16–17 (noting imperial constraints placed
on the emperor’s powers); Wang, supra note 327, at 3 (noting that legalist
demands periodically resulted in the law’s dissemination).
474
A third option is to use a legitimized, transparent lawmaking process
to update the rules. But at least two complications make this possibility
unappealing to the CCP. First, procedural formalities are time-consuming and
stability in authoritarian states is often tenuous. Reactive laws seldom quell
present uprisings. And second, an open, regular process could subject rule-making
to a high degree of influence from actors outside of the Party, who might come to
view their participation in rule-making as a right.
475
“Deng Xiaoping . . . saw no incongruity between capitalist economic
methods and the Stalinist political system over which he presided.” MEISNER,
supra note 351, at 514–15. See also FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 363 (noting
that the Party is not subordinated to law); MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 383–
84 (noting that Deng Xiaoping shut down the 1978 Democracy Wall soon after
appearing to endorse it); Brantly Womack, In Search of Democracy: Public
Authority and Popular Power in China, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 53, 84 (Brantly Womack ed., 1991) (noting that Deng
Xiaoping retreated on reforms when social forces began to challenge the Party).
476
See Lubman, supra note 37, at 4; see also EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG
XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 251–65 (2011) (discussing the
reformers’ desire to limit some freedoms even while expanding others).
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very ambiguity.477 Still, this has put the Party in an uncomfortable
position: the CCP has no intention of democratizing,478 yet it has
had to promote citizens’ legal consciousness through a lengthy law
dissemination campaign.479
The third critical challenge posed by formal law was
enmeshed with the preceding two. Once a society legitimizes
private enterprise and allows some degree of affluence outside of the
state’s immediate purview, it necessarily accepts some degree of
influence outside of the state as well. Though influence is not
exclusively a function of money, history’s most indelible axiom
endures, unmoved even by the most intensive Communist
propaganda: power tends inextricably to follow wealth.480 It is
simply not possible for the CCP to allow private wealth without a
corresponding rise of potential competitors for power.481 To be
sure, not all private interests will become actual competitors for
power: some will discover a sufficient interest in the status quo, and
the CCP thus proactively co-opts private interests through Party
membership.482 Still, this strategy has its limits.483
It is
extraordinary that the CCP voluntarily created the conditions for
potential challengers to exist, since “[t]he first impulse of any
477

Xiao Li, Legal and Economic Development with Sui Generis Chinese
Characteristics: A Systems Theorist’s Perspective, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 159, 200
(2014).
478
WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING
75–76 (2015).
479
Young Nam Cho, Law Dissemination Campaign in China: The
Origin of Chinese ‘Rule of Law’ Policy, 21 J. INT’L & AREA STUD. 27 (2014).
480
See, e.g., ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 16 (discussing
the relationship between wealth and power in politics). Of course, power can
beget wealth as well.
481
Nearly all incumbents have rivals for power. BUENO DE MESQUITA ET
AL., supra note 445, at 8, 16–18. As exclusionary arrangements, authoritarian
states invariably create rivals. See generally Slater, supra note 165.
482
WEALTH INTO POWER, supra note 233, at 66–100.
483
For example, the Party competes with private employers for human
capital. STARR, supra note 457, at 58. The empowerment of social groups is also
witnessed in the rise of mass protests. See generally LI CHEN, SOCIAL PROTEST
AND CONTENTIOUS AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA (2012). Thus, the CCP blurs
the lines between state and society to prevent “the emergence of formal
institutions that will constrain party power.” FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 16.
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organization . . . on the appearance of a serious competitor is to
destroy competition.”484
The CCP’s embrace of such an
environment is a testament to the dire circumstances prevailing after
Mao, and to the reformers’ recognition that a private market was
absolutely essential to finance China’s sovereignty.485 Most of all,
however, this willingness was a testament to the CCP’s confidence
that it could effectively check the power connoted in a private
market. Flexible legality empowers the CCP to tailor its responses
to the inevitable institutional exigencies arising under the influence
of foreign investment and with the legitimization of private wealth.
In this way, the Party can allow private actors their economic
pursuits and even some constructive latitude to influence the
development of law while maintaining its own preeminence in
institutional entrepreneurship.
Democracies need not exhibit a zero-sum game between the
nation’s strength internationally and the political incumbents’
strength domestically. But in an authoritarian state, where one
group monopolizes political authority at the exclusion of others, an
unavoidable tension arises: the greater the amount of privately-held
wealth, the stronger the PRC can be against the world—but also the
more likely that affluent domestic actors might one day credibly
challenge the CCP’s monopoly.486 The Party is mindful of the fact
that private interests, backed by wealth, can compete for
influence.487 Major instability has been avoided in the reform era,
as its flexible legal system has helped the CCP to moderate the
pressures to democratize inherent in the state’s dependence upon

484

Edward A. Ross, Institutional Competition, 25 J. SOC. 171, 171
(1919). Indeed, “the accumulation of wealth by anyone not in an elite role poses
a great temptation and a threat to the elite.” FRED W. RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 143 (1964) (emphasis omitted).
485
See supra Parts III.B.4, III.C.
486
See supra Part III.C.
487
See FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 354–55, 375–76, 384; Kennedy
& Stiglitz, supra note 160, at 490; see also supra notes 232, 287 and
accompanying text (discussing guild power in the Qing and Republican eras
respectively).
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publicly-derived taxes.488 Legal flexibilities provide legitimate
cover for the CCP to intervene and prevent any actor or coalition
from becoming capable of challenging its authority, without
upsetting the broader economic frameworks in place.
Alternatively stated, the mere existence of formal
institutions also ensures the existence of rival institutional
entrepreneurs. The flexibility of China’s legal system allows
regulated parties and lower-level officials to influence the meanings
and effectiveness of these institutions.489 But higher-level officials
can thereby allow for the reasonable adaptation of their policy
preferences to local circumstances within their preferred
boundaries.490
In sum, the PRC’s flexible formal legality allows the
substance and enforcement of legal rules to shift constantly,
entailing a high degree of dynamism. But what does not change—
what cannot change—is the law’s underlying flexibility. This
reflects the CCP’s determination—having heeded the lessons of
history491—to hold an ongoing competitive advantage in the
competency of institutional entrepreneurship. It is a continuous act
of institutional entrepreneurship to preserve the legal
superstructure’s flexibility, reinforced by the path dependent
‘momentum’ that the flexible legal system now possesses—but
opposed by those interests that would benefit economically from
greater certainty and predictability. The CCP’s effort to resist legal
488

See generally Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, Political
Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change, 42 COMP. LEGAL STUD. 167
(2009).
489
See generally LILY L. TSAI, supra note 194; KELLEE S. TSAI, supra
note 194.
490
See generally CORNE, supra note 159. The argument here—that the
CCP benefits from high degrees of legal flexibility not only because it facilitates
changes to policy but also because it forces the Party to strategically manage the
law’s institutional framework—is consistent with John Campbell’s proposition
that “[i]nnovations that best fit the prevailing institutional context will be more
likely to result in evolutionary rather than revolutionary change than those that do
not fit as well.” JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
GLOBALIZATION 181 (2004). The Party desires evolutionary change because it is
easier to control, and because the CCP, more than any other interest, stands to lose
from revolutionary change. See supra Part III.B.
491
See supra Part III.B.
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entrenchment is aided by the law’s very flexibility and amplifies its
importance as a higher-order institutional feature. The Party is most
likely to fall not from an organized rebellion as in prior epochs of
Chinese history, but rather from losing the battle for the ‘soul’ of the
PRC’s formal institutions, or from irreparably disintegrating its
legitimacy in maintaining control.
This Part has proceeded under the rubric of institutional
theory, since the law is an institution subject to the principles of
institutional design.492 Yet the discussion above makes clear that
the PRC’s legal institutions represent a resource more so than an
institution per se from the CCP’s perspective. The PRC’s flexible
legal system has been a central resource on which the CCP relies to
ensure its ongoing dominance in institutional entrepreneurship, and
it is thus a key resource in perpetuating the CCP’s survival. While it
is beyond the scope of this Paper to consider how the resource-based
view493 informs our assessment of why the Party embraced legal
flexibility, it seems anecdotally apparent that the CCP has mimicked
what firms can do: combining resources and institutions to achieve
competitive advantage.494 The Party began with the question of
what resource was needed to best secure its monopoly after Mao,
and built institutions in response. This is the opposite sequence of
steps for firms’ institutional strategies (in the short-term, anyway):
firms begin with the question of what institutions exist, and then
determine how they can best be utilized as resources.495 While firms
and the state might both find institutions at the center of their
492

See supra Part II.
The resource-based view is another leading theory in international
business and “posits that firms may obtain sustainable competitive advantage by
focusing on strategies that leverage their internal resources to take advantage of
environmental opportunities.” Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive
Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 65 (2011).
494
See, e.g., Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage:
Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697
(1997). The CCP’s competitive advantage has been its dominance in institutional
entrepreneurship.
495
See supra Part I. This is the subject of the LAS literature, of which
legal entrepreneurship is a part. Of course, individual firms might in the longerterm also seek to create, change, or destroy institutions, acting as institutional
entrepreneurs as well.
493
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respective strategies, they will often approach institutions and
institutional design from opposite directions.
This analysis has served several purposes. First, it explains
why the CCP has opted for a flexible and inefficient legal design
even as economic growth remains central to the CCP’s success. A
flexible legal system enables the CCP to balance its myriad
competing goals and constraints; most crucially, it enables and
encourages private economic activity while still empowering the
CCP to check the potential competitors for power that invariably
result from private affluence. Its flexibility affords the Party
maximum scope to act legitimately—that is, consistently with the
commitments embodied in the law. Flexible legality also supplies
the Party-state, at all levels, with a framework in which the
legitimacy of the state’s identity as institutional entrepreneur is
continuous rather than ad hoc or intermittent. While this may
necessitate the resolution of regulatory events on a case-by-case
basis (subject always to the ambits of CCP policy), the same
flexibilities ensure that the CCP need not re-justify its role as
institutional entrepreneur in exercising its power. This enables the
CCP to undertake specific acts of policy-making as “institutional
work,” or “purposive actions that [create] . . . new institutional
frameworks[.]”496 The legal institutions of the PRC coordinate
interests, announce general policies, and enhance the credibility of
rules497—hallmarks of any legal system. Yet what really defines
Chinese law is not its formal artifacts but rather the leadership of the
CCP,498 and the strength of its approach to law “is not its coherence
but its openness to unexpected and tentative policy solutions that are
seized upon when they come up.”499 Flexible law, then, allows the

496

Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584.
Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 465, at 330.
498
TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 223–25 (2013) (noting that
the ideological stakes of theorizing the rule of law are high and are thus taken
seriously, and that China’s conflicting institutions ensure that the Party remains
the true source of power); accord Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten
Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in
China, 36 MOD. CHINA 12, 23 (2010).
499
Sebastian Heilmann, Maximum Tinkering Under Uncertainty:
Unorthodox Lessons from China, 35 MOD. CHINA 450, 453 (2009).
497
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CCP to cope with the uncertainties of its own environment500 and is
therefore likely to endure.501 The motivation for this approach, we
have seen, was born of the reformers’ ability to interpret China’s
recent history more skillfully than their predecessors: while formal
law would be essential to the country’s global restoration, legal
institutions could be made to serve the CCP’s domestic interests
only if flexible enough to discourage and defeat the Party’s potential
rivals for institutional authority.
Second, the analysis illustrates the centrality of institutional
entrepreneurship to the CCP’s stability and revealed the Party’s
conscious recognition of the need to establish and maintain a
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship. A system
of flexible, formal legality retains this advantage for the CCP while
minimizing the erosion of its legitimacy.
Third, this analysis implies a limit to the degree of certainty
and predictability that PRC law can achieve before it becomes
politically destabilizing.502 Entrenched legal institutions would, by
definition, be perilously independent of and immune to the CCP’s
influence. By promulgating a highly flexible law, the CCP
disallows other actors from enacting a particular path dependent
direction in the law without the Party’s consent. In the end, only one
principle and one means remain entrenched in PRC law: the
principle of the Party’s monopoly, and the flexible means by which
it exerts its ongoing supremacy in institutional entrepreneurship.
Viewed thusly, the CCP—for whom economic growth is extremely
important—could rationally engineer legal institutions that are
500

Id. at 454; Heilmann & Perry, supra note 335, at 12.
Heilmann, supra note 499, at 460; Lubman, supra note 37, at 4
(discussing “rolling uncertainty” in the PRC legal system).
502
Some observers predict that the Party will be forced to abandon legal
flexibility on account of China’s international legal obligations. See, e.g., Richard
Wu, The Changing Regime for Regulating Loans of State Owned Banks in China:
Towards a System of Prudential Banking, 26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 107, 139–41
(2009). But this study extrapolated one small subset of Chinese law to the PRC
legal system generally. This also underestimates the importance of flexibility to
the Party’s survival, the CCP’s entrepreneurial dexterity, the rate at which new
flexibilities are created, and the extent of flexibility in international legal
institutions. See infra Part IV (discussing flexibility in international legal
institutions).
501
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economically suboptimal. Razo observes that “[c]hoosing rules
about rules (that is, meta-institutional choices) immediately invites
the possibility of an infinite regress in which participants cannot
readily agree on preferred institutions in a prior stage (and higher
choice level).”503 But the choice of flexibility as the ‘metainstitutional rule’ of PRC law has helped to unify the CCP’s factions
in that legal flexibility provides a measure of security against losing
the privileged positions that they share with one another.
With respect to LAS, this analysis has applied business
constructs to the legal-historical context to show how states can
approach law strategically. The LAS literature has focused on law’s
strategic value solely from the firm’s vantage. However, a link
between law and competitive advantage holds for states, too, in the
state’s role as designer of legal institutions—that is, as institutional
entrepreneur. Political incumbents can design legal institutions as
instruments of self-preservation. The Paper makes a second related
contribution to LAS. An MNC’s recognition of the Party’s
entrepreneurial capacity is vital to firm-level strategy in China. The
PRC’s historical forces have shaped the institutional environment
that now confronts MNCs in China. Accordingly, the analysis here
should inform the contextualization of MNCs’ non-market
strategies in China today.504
China’s approach clearly sacrifices the legal entrenchment
that is fundamental to Western rule of law.505 But the first objective
of the PRC legal system is not to ensure stability for those whom it
regulates; its paramount goal is instead to advance the interests of
the CCP.506 Yet while the flexibility of Chinese law is motivated by

503

Armando Razo, Strategic Embeddedness and the Microfoundations
of Collective Action: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Rule of Law and
Informal Institutions in Cooperation Games, 28 J. THEOR. POL. 105, 107 (2016).
504
See infra Part V.
505
See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism,
and Constitutional Collapse, 103 VA. L. REV. 631 (2017).
506
This stands in obvious contrast to American legal thought, in which
law is often understood through its “social purpose.” Justin Desautels-Stein, A
Context for Legal History, or, This Is Not Your Father’s Contextualism, 56 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 29, 32 (2016). Differing assumptions concerning law and its
societal role help to explain the Western view that the flexibilities and

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4

84

EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/27/19 8:08 PM

EXPLAINING CHINA’S LEGAL FLEXIBILITY

257

the CCP’s self-interest, this does not mean—as is often assumed in
the West—that the effects of China’s legal uncertainties are entirely
negative. The CCP cannot capture the benefits of legal flexibility
for itself without also creating opportunities for firms to likewise
engage those flexibilities to their ends.507 Understanding the
implications of this context is essential to the legal strategies of
MNCs in China today.508
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
We have seen how the CCP strategically engineered a formal
legal system rife with flexibilities to promote its myriad interests—
especially to preserve its dominance in, and continuous exercise of,
institutional entrepreneurship.509 It is worth noting here that
governments similarly create and utilize legal flexibilities in the
global context.510 Cross-jurisdictional legal rules are bound to be
uncertain because international institutions must accommodate “the
two poles of sovereignty and community”511 and because
“[p]owerful states delegate authority to international institutions, but
they do so in ways that allow them to retain substantial degrees of
control.”512
uncertainties of PRC law are exclusively negative. See supra Part I (noting this
view).
507
See supra Part I.
508
See infra Part V (discussing the need for further research on how
MNCs can best strategically account for the PRC’s legal flexibilities in light of
the historical context discussed here).
509
See supra Part III.
510
For a helpful overview work, see generally Oliver Kessler, The Same
as it Never Was? Uncertainty and the Changing Contours of International Law,
37 REV. INT’L STUD. 2163 (2011) (discussing the implications of uncertainty and
risk in a post-national international law regime).
511
JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2nd ed. 2009).
512
Randall W. Stone, Institutions, Power, and Interdependence, in
POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 31, 48
(Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds., 2009). Customary international law,
which one might equate to informal (uncodified) norms, is also characterized by
high degrees of uncertainty. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the
Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of
Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004).
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States deliberately build flexibility into their agreements
with one another.513 Ambiguities can help to facilitate the resolution
of conflicts, accommodate evolving circumstances without the need
to renegotiate treaties, afford states greater latitude to respond to
crises, and in some cases can have a greater deterrence than certain
predefined sanctioning.514 Treaties are often reinterpreted over time
so as to change their meanings.515 The rules governing international
organizations can of course be formally amended by the constituent
member states, but can also change through informal means.516
International rules that strategically combine certainty and
flexibility can balance the incentives of private actors to engage in
global commerce with states’ needs to sometimes deviate from
rules.517 Regional trade agreements can also be designed flexibly to
promote cooperation and other objectives.518 Sound monetary
institutions, for instance, will make credible commitments but will
513

TRIPS provides a high profile example. See generally Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS
Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2011) (arguing that conflicts rules in
TRIPS-plus free trade agreements can themselves be interpreted creatively to
achieve a similar policy space to that offered by the TRIPS flexibilities with
respect to implementing free trade obligations in intellectual property).
514
Itay Fischhendler, When Ambiguity in Treaty Design Becomes
Destructive: A Study of Transboundary Water, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL POL. 111, 111–
12 (2008). Of course, there are also negative tradeoffs in the use of ambiguities.
Id.
515
See generally Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive
Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation Over Time and Their Diverse
Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. INT’L COURTS & TRIBS. 9 (2010).
516
Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional
Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE INT’L
L.J. 289 (2013) (arguing that one key means of informal change is through the
international organization’s judicial organ reinterpreting its constitutional
document).
517
See, e.g., Stefan M. Miller, Parallel Imports: Towards a Flexible
Uniform International Rule, 15 J. COM. BIOTECH. 21 (2009) (advocating for a
flexible system of international exhaustion concerning parallel imports in the
intellectual property context).
518
The African Regional Trade Agreements do just this. See James Thuo
Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes, 35 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 571 (2010).
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also flexibly accommodate uncertainties.519 Flexibility is hailed as
a key positive feature in transgovernmental networks, which enable
government regulators to work with their foreign counterparts on
global problems requiring regulation across countries.520
Flexibilities in international institutions can extend so far as to allow
countries to escape their agreed-upon obligations.521 Much like this
Paper has argued that the PRC’s legal flexibilities benefit the CCP,
“safeguard clauses” allowing countries to exit international
institutions likewise reflect the countries’ self-interested
behavior.522
One interesting question is whether the PRC will hold an
advantage in influencing or creating international legal institutions,
given its experiences with legal flexibility domestically. The PRC
has an incentive, like any country, to promote its interests globally.
And in China’s case, Joseph Fewsmith has suggested that “[t]he
apparent tension between globalization and domestic challenges”
implies that the PRC will face difficulties in the future as it
reconciles its domestic institutions with global ones,523 affording the
CCP an additional incentive to shape global rules. As the CCP’s
embrace of domestic legal flexibility signaled its confidence that it
could allow for potential competitors while preventing them from
becoming too powerful, so may China’s engagement with
international institutions portend its facility to bend them to its
interests.
519

Susanne Lohmann, Sollbruchstelle: Deep Uncertainty and the Design
of Monetary Institutions, 3 INT’L FIN. 391 (2000) (applying the German
engineering precept of sollbruchstelle to argue that institutions must be designed
to accommodate evolving conditions and to themselves be adaptable in the face
of changing circumstances).
520
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional
Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental
Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing as an example the
Financial Action Task Force).
521
See generally B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal
Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L
ORG. 829 (2001).
522
Id.
523
Joseph Fewsmith, The Challenges of Stability and Legitimacy, in
CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING 92, 111 (Robert S. Ross & Jo Inge Bekkevold
eds., 2016).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Paper has argued that the PRC’s high degree of legal
flexibility exists due to the factors suggested in prior works, but also
for another fundamental reason. The CCP’s reformers gleaned a
crucial insight from their historical context when they realized that
China’s previous rulers had failed in large part because they were
unskilled in institutional entrepreneurship—the ability to create,
maintain, modify and destroy institutions as needed. Following
Mao’s reign, the reformers acknowledged that investment-driven
development was necessary for China, and with it, formal legal
institutions—which meant that for the Party to remain securely in
power, it had to institutionalize its role as China’s preeminent
institutional entrepreneur. But this needed to be accomplished
without strongly committing the Party to particular policy paths, and
at the same time, the Party would have to avoid being perceived as
indifferent to the ‘commitments’ that can be read in its laws. Above
all, the Party would have to allow potential rival institutional
entrepreneurs to exist and even to contribute to the development of
China’s laws—but without losing ultimate authority over the
country’s legal landscape.
The answer was to design a system of flexible formal
legality. The CCP relies upon economic growth in the maintenance
of its legitimacy, but growth capable of destabilizing its rule would
be as undesirable as no growth at all from the Party’s perspective.
Accordingly, the economic suboptimalities inherent in China’s
flexible laws are not the paradox they appear to be. Myriad tensions
remain within the PRC legal system, but its overriding goals—
growth bounded by the CCP’s ongoing control—mean that Western
businesspeople and attorneys must modify the lens through which
they view China’s law and history. The PRC’s flexible legal system
ensures that private interests can contribute to the country’s
institutional evolution—but always along paths that the Party deems
acceptable. China’s flexible legal institutions thus serve the Party’s
strategic interests, of which economic development, while
important, is made to reinforce the CCP’s ongoing rule. These
conclusions suggest that the LAS scholarship must account for the
state’s use of law in the formulation of its own competitive
advantages.
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Finally, MNCs doing business in China should also make
strategic use of these flexibilities by approaching the law
entrepreneurially. While this idea has been suggested conceptually
and in a general way,524 empirical research is needed to better
understand whether (and how) firms strategically engage with
China’s legal flexibilities. The historical context and institutional
nature of China’s flexible law discussed here can be harnessed in the
strategies of individual companies doing business in China today.525
The ambiguities of Chinese law in past eras, when law was perhaps
not nearly as ambiguous, were known to stimulate creative
discussion.526 The flexibility of modern PRC law supplies a
conducive context for firms to embrace the law’s full strategic
potential. It remains to be seen how this could—or should—work in
practice. This is not to say that legal uncertainties are entirely
positive. To be sure, the PRC legal environment carries risks for the
firm. But these risks must be understood in conjunction with
opportunity, and the firm’s cognizance of the history of China’s
legal flexibility will empower it to embrace legal uncertainty not
only as a risk, but also as a strategic opportunity. Indeed, it is
precisely because China’s legal flexibility often complicates
predictions concerning the permissibility of one’s potential actions
that having a thorough understanding of Chinese law in historical
context is an asset for the MNC.

524

See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3.
“Legal history is, can, and should be a mode of analysis to help us to
understand not just the past on its own terms, but the present and future on our
terms as well.” Roman J. Hoyos, Legal History as Political Thought, 56 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 76, 76 (2016). See also Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal
History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 233, 233–34 (2013) (defining applied legal history
as “deeply researched, serious scholarship that is motivated by, engages with, or
speaks to contemporary issues”).
526
See, e.g., Michael Dalby, Revenge and the Law in Traditional China,
25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267, 270 n.5 (1981) (discussing the sanction of revenge in
ancient Chinese texts and observing that while these texts were ambiguous, they
stimulated, rather than stifled, “creative discussion” on the legal permissibility of
revenge as a social practice). Of course, as was noted above, ambiguities in law
can also cause problems for regulated parties. Hence, the firm’s ability to cope
effectively with uncertainty and ambiguity in the law is a crucial asset in one’s
non-market strategy. See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3.
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